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by
Marshall 1. Doke, Jr.*
I. INTRODUCTION
A. GeneralO NE OF the best illustrations of the development of a substantial
and distinct body of law applicable to contracts with the federal
government is in the area of mistakes. This development, however,
has not been uniformly recognized, and indiscriminate application
of common-law contract rules to mistake cases in government con-
tracts occasionally has caused considerable confusion. State courts are
having great difficulty formulating rules governing mistake cases
in contracts involving the state or local governments. This difficulty
is primarily attributable to their attempt to reconcile and follow
precedent in both private and government contract law.
In the field of government contracts, the law of mistake involves
the concept of fault. In most cases, the ultimate legal issue (aside
from evidentiary matters) is whether or not the government con-
tracting officer adequately discharged his error detection duty. The
legal literature discussing the nature and extent of this error detec-
tion duty is extremely limited, principally because the great pre-
ponderance of precedent consists of unreported decisions of the
Comptroller General of the United States. Nevertheless, it is clear
that a contracting officer must have a reasonable understanding of
the nature and extent of his error detection duty in order to dis-
charge such duty consistently and adequately. Similarly, a bidder
or contractor must have a reasonable understanding of the contract-
ing officer's duty before the possibility of relief for a specific mistake
can be evaluated. This Article, therefore, will discuss the contracting
officer's duty in this area. The discussion is intended to serve the
dual purpose of assisting contracting officers in the discharge of their
* Attorney at Law, Dallas, Texas. Vice Chairman (Southwest Area), Public Contracts
Division, American Bar Association Administrative Law Section; General Counsel (JAGC),
Army Contract Adjustment Board 1960-62.
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responsibilities as well as assisting bidders and contractors to obtain
relief from mistakes in situations in which the contracting officer has
failed to discharge his error detection duty.
B. Federal Common Law
The choice of law with respect to the validity and construction of
government contracts illustrates an area of law in which the rule
of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins' is inapplicable. In the leading case on
this point, the Supreme Court noted the disparities, confusions, and
conflicts that would follow if the Government's general authority
were subject to local controls and stated:
The validity and construction of contracts through which the United
States is exercising its constitutional functions, their consequences on
the rights and obligations of the parties, the titles or liens which they
create or permit, all present questions of federal law not controlled by
the law of any state ....
The nature and source of this "federal law," of course, presents an
additional question. The Supreme Court has stated that in cases in
which the Erie rule does not apply and in the absence of an applicable
statute "it is for the federal courts to fashion the governing rule of
law according to their own standards,"' and that principles of "gen-
eral contract law" customarily are applied to government contracts
if Congress has not adopted a different standard.4
Although there are relatively few court decisions involving mis-
takes in government contracts, a substantial body of federal "com-
mon law"' has developed principally from opinions of the Comp-
' 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The Court specifically excepted "matters governed by the Federal
Constitution or by Acts of Congress .. " Id. at 78.
"United States v. County of Allegheny, 332 U.S. 174, 183 (1944). Accord, Priebe &
Sons, Inc. v. United States, 322 U.S. 407 (1947); United States v. Jones, 176 F.2d 278
(9th Cir. 1949); United States v. Lipman, 122 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1954); Kemp v.
United States, 38 F. Supp. 568 (D.C. Md. 1941). The position of the Court of Claims on
this point, until recently, has not been clear. Compare Armstrong v. United States, 144
Ct. Cl. 441, 169 F. Supp. 259 (1959), rev'd on other grounds, 364 U.S. 40 (1960), with
Houdaille Indus., Inc. v. United States, 138 Ct. Cl. 301, 151 F. Supp. 298 (1957). The
Court of Claims recently held, however, that contracts with the United States are governed
by uniform federal "common law," stating: "This Court has occasionally suggested that
state law applied, but in those cases the situations were distinguishable--e.g., federal law
followed state law because general uniformity was not appropriate--or the statements in
the opinions were inadvertent or unnecessary." Padblock Co. v. United States, Ct. C1. No.
523-57 (April 5, 1963).
'Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943).
'Priebe & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 322 U.S. 407, 411 (1947). The Court of Claims
recently stated that "federal contract law" should take account of the best in modern
decision and discussion. Padblock Co. v. United States, Ct. Cl. No. 523-57 (April 5, 1963).
' This term is used here in reference to the growth of a substantial body of "precedent,"
albeit nonjudicial, recognized as authoritative by both contractors and procurement officials.
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troller General of the United States, who is vested by statute with
control and direction of the General Accounting Office.' Although
the Comptroller General's authority in this area is beyond the scope
of this Article,' it is generally recognized today that the Comptroller
General's decisions are the most influential force in the government
contract field.' These decisions, for example, have far greater influ-
ence than do opinions of the Attorney General of the United States.!
Part of this influence results from the large volume of decisions. For
example, in one year the Comptroller General decided over four
hundred cases involving mistakes in bids and contracts."°
The action of the Comptroller General in deciding cases requiring
an interpretation of law has been characterized as quasi-judicial."
Although the decisions are not binding upon the courts, they are
cited by courts as precedent in cases involving government con-
tracts.' Perhaps the principal basis for attaching greater "weight"
to decisions of the Comptroller General than ordinarily would be
accorded nonjudicial opinions is that the executive agencies have
accepted the Comptroller General's decisions as binding upon the
0 The General Accounting Office (hereinafter called GAO) and the office of Comptroller
General of the United States were created by the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921,
42 Stat. 20, 31 U.S.C. § 1.
7In this connection, see Birnbaum, Government Contracts: The Role of the Comptroller
General, 42 A.B.A.J. 433 (1956); Foster, The General Accounting Office and Government
Claims, 16 J.B.A.D.C. 193, 275, 321 (1949); Langeluttig, Legal Status of the Comptroller
General of the United States, 23 Il1. L. Rev. 556 (1929); Welch, The General Accounting
Office in Government Procurement, 14 Fed. B.J. 321 (1954).
8 See Note, The Comptroller General of the United States: The Broad Power to Settle
and Adjust All Claims and Accounts, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 350, 357 (1956). It has been this
writer's observation that many federal procurement officials attach greater significance to
decisions of the Comptroller General than to judicial determinations. In the area of mistakes,
the following statement has been made: "As a matter of practice, the administrative officers
of the Government rarely challenge the Comptroller General's authority in this area."
2 McBride & Wachtel, Government Contracts § 12.10 [1] (1963).
9 In 1 McBride & Wachtel, Government Contracts § 7.80 [1] (1963), the following
statement is made:
While the legality of a Government contract and the validity of bids in
general would appear properly and legally to be a matter for consideration by
the Attorney General of the United States as the chief law officer of the
Government, apparently he has relinquished this function to the Comptroller
General. In consequence, executive departments are forced in most instances
to refer such cases to the Comptroller General for a decision ...
It has been suggested that the Comptroller General's pre-eminence in the field of govern-
ment contracts results from a combination of (a) the powers conferred by the Budget
and Accounting Act of 1921, 42 Stat. 20, 31 U.S.C. § 1, (b) the independence of the
Comptroller General and the GAO from the executive department, and (c) the fiscal
accountability of disbursing officers to the GAO. Birnbaum, supra note 7, at 490.
'0 Welch, Mistakes in Bids, 18 Fed. B.J. 75 (1958).
aBrunswick v. Elliott, 103 F.2d 746, 750 (D.C. Cir. 1939).
12 See, e.g., United States v. Sabin Metal Corp., 151 F. Supp. 683 (S.D.N.Y. 1957);
Prestex Inc. v. United States, - Ct. Cl. _, 320 F.2d 367 (1963); M.F. Kemper Constr.
Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 37 Cal. App. 2d 696, 235 P.2d 7, 11 (1951).
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executive branch of the Government."5 Consequently, procurement
officials and contractors customarily refer to these decisions for guid-
ance in resolving procurement problems and disputes. Moreover, if
such decisions are binding on the executive branch, the Comptroller
General's determinations with regard to the duty of government
contracting officers may establish standards or responsibilities with
which a contracting officer must comply if his actions are to be
considered in "good faith."" The courts should, it is believed, give
considerable weight to the custom and practice in the field of gov-
ernment contracts as reflected in decisions of the Comptroller Gen-
eral involving the duty or obligation of a contracting officer.
C. Formation Of Government Contracts
Any analysis or discussion of mistake cases in government con-
tracts must be based upon an understanding of the legal significance
of three critical periods of time separated by two important events.
These periods are: (1) before the bids are opened, (2) after the bids
are opened but before award of the contract, and (3) after the
award. A brief discussion of the law relating to the formation of
government contracts will emphasize the significance of these per-
iods of time and the events separating such periods. As the vast
majority of cases involving mistakes arise under formal advertising
procedures,'5 this method will be discussed."6
1 In a recent case, John Reiner & Co. v. United States, Ct. Cl. No. 431-57 (Dec. 13,
1963), the Court of Claims stated: "[I]t is the usual policy, if not the obligation, of
the procuring departments to accommodate themselves to positions formally taken by the
General Accounting Office with respect to competitive bidding." This position is based
upon the statutory language that the balances certified by the GAO in the exercise of its
duty to settle and adjust public accounts and claims against the Government are "final
and conclusive" upon the executive branch. 42 Stat. 24 (1921), 31 U.S.C. §§ 71, 74
(1958).
" In John Reiner & Co. v. United States, supra note 13, the Court of Claims said: "He
[the Comptroller General] is not confined to the minimal measure of legality but can
sponsor and encourage the observance of higher standards by procuring agencies." Therefore,
it can be argued that any action by a contracting officer which falls below standards
established by decisions which are binding on the procuring departments could not be
considered in "good faith."
' Government contracts are divided into two categories-formally advertised contracts
and negotiated contracts. The procurement statutes impose the general requirement that all
contracts be let by formal advertising. See Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947, §
2(c), 10 U.S.C. § 2304(a) (1958), as amended, 10 U.S.C.A. § 2304(a) (Supp. 1962)
(applicable to procurement by the Armed Services, Department of the Treasury, and the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration); Federal Property and Administrative
Services Act of 1949, § 302(c), 63 Stat. 377, 393, as amended, 41 U.S.C. § 252(c) (1958)
(applicable to the General Services Administration and other executive agencies). Both of
these statutes contain exceptions to this requirement and permit procurement by "negotiation"
under the enumerated circumstances. See I McBride & Wachtel, op. cit. supra note 9, at § 9.
" The principles of the federal common law relating to mistakes are applicable to
negotiated as well as formally advertised procurements. See, e.g., Unpublished Decision of
the Comptroller General No. B-144238, Oct. 28, 1960 (hereafter referred to as Unpub.
Comp. Gen.); Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-142810, July 20, 1960; Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-138687,
March 17, 1959; Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-137288, Oct. 31, 1958.
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Procurement by formal advertising normally is initiated by an
"Invitation For Bids" (IFB) mailed to prospective bidders and posted
at the purchasing office or at some other public place. The IFB re-
quests prospective contractors to submit sealed bids (offers) to per-
form work or to furnish specified supplies or service in strict accord-
ance with specifications and contract provisions set forth in the
IFB. Prospective bidders are notified that bids will be received by
the procurement office until a designated hour and date at which
time the bids will be publicly opened. The IFB further provides that
the offer contained in the bid is irrevocable for a specified period
of time."' This departure from the rule in private contract law (that
an offer ordinarily may be withdrawn at any time before accept-
ance'") is now an accepted principle of government contract law."'
The procurement regulations" provide that bids may be modified
or withdrawn prior to the time set for public opening,' but bids or
1' For example, Standard Form 33, "INVITATION, BID, AND AWARD (Supply
Contract)" (Oct. 1957 ed.), provides that bids may not be withdrawn after the time set
for opening. In addition, the bidder is required to agree that the offer will not be revoked,
inasmuch as the bid itself provides:
In compliance with the above, the undersigned [bidder] offers and agrees,
if this Bid be accepted within __ calendar days (60 calendar days unless
a different period be inserted by the bidder) from the date of opening, to
furnish any or all of the items upon which prices are quoted ....
a1 Williston, Contracts § 55 (3d ed. 1957). The common-law rule is that irrevocable
offers must be supported by consideration. This rule is changed by section 2-205 of the
Uniform Commercial Code which provides that "firm offers" (as defined therein) are not
revocable for lack of consideration.
19 United States v. Lipman, 122 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1954); Refining Associates, Inc.
v. United States, 124 Ct. Cl. 115, 109 F. Supp. 259 (1953); Scott v. United States, 44
Ct. Cl. 524 (1909); 30 Ops. Att'y Gen. 56 (1913); Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-151424, June
21, 1963; 29 Comp. Gen. 341 (1950); 19 Comp. Gen. 761 (1940). In the Scott case,
the court suggested that the departure from the general rule was justified as a matter of
public policy in view of the opportunities for collusion and fraud which otherwise would
be present in the public bidding procedures. Scott v. United States, supra at 527-28. In the
Refining Associates case, however, the court indicated that the principle may not be in-
consistent with the rules applicable to private parties in view of its suggestion that the
bidder receives consideration for the promise to keep the bid open; namely, the bidder
is "accorded the right of having its bid considered on its merits . . . . " Refining Associates,
Inc. v. United States, supra at 262. This latter point is consistent with the court's decision
in Heyer Prods. Co. v. United States, 135 Ct. Cl. 63, 140 F. Supp. 409 (1956), in which
it held that a bidder may recover the expenses incurred in preparing the bid if the bid
is rejected in bad faith. For a general discussion of the irrevocability of bids in government
contract law, see Note, The Application of Common-Law Contract Principles in the Court
of Claims: 1950 to Present, 49 Va. L. Rev. 773, 774-76 (1963).
" Generally, military procurement is governed by the Armed Services Procurement
Regulation, 32 C.F.R., pts. 1-39, 3 Gov't Cont. Rep. 5 32000 (hereinafter cited "ASPR"
with appropriate section number; all citations, unless otherwise indicated, are to the 1963
edition of ASPR). Procurement by nonmilitary agencies is governed by the Federal Pro-
curement Regulation, 41 C.F.R. ch. 1, 5 Gov't Cont. Rep. 5 66000 (hereinafter cited
"FPR" with appropriate section number). Parallel citations to the Code of Federal Regula-
tions are omitted for both ASPR and FPR since this source is rarely used in view of the
frequent revisions to the regulations.
"' Modifications or withdrawals of bids may be made by written or telegraphic notice
to the procurement office not later than the exact time set for opening of bids. ASPR §
2-304 (1963 ed. Rev. No. 2); FPR § 1-2.304.
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modifications of bids received in the procurement office after the exact
time set for opening are "late bids" which may not be considered
for award except in certain limited circumstances in which the late-
ness is not caused by the bidder.2
At the time specified in the invitation, bids are publicly opened
and normally are read aloud to the persons present. In addition, the
procurement regulations require that the names of bidders, prices
bid, and other information be recorded in an "abstract of bids"
which is available for public inspection except in classified procure-
ments." Thereafter follows the period of evaluation of bids. The
procurement statutes permit little discretion in procurement offi-
cials with regard to the acceptance of bids." Essentially, the evalua-
tion consists of determining the lowest correct bid' (or highest in
the case of sale of government property) that is eligible for accept-
ance in view of two statutory requirements; namely (1) the bidder
must be responsible'5 and (2) the bid must be responsive 2 to the
invitation. Occasionally, evaluation will result in the rejection of
2 ASPR 5 2-303 (1963 ed. Rev. No. 2); FPR 55 1-2.303-1 and 1-2.305.
23ASPR 5 2-403; FPR 5 1-2.403.
2Section 3 (b) of the Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947, 10 U.S.C. 5 2305(c)
(1958), provides:
Award shall be made with reasonable promptness by written notice to that
responsible bidder whose bid, conforming to the invitation for bids, will be
most advantageous to the Government, price and other factors considered:
Provided, That all bids may be rejected when the agency head determines that
it is in the public interest so to do.
5 The determination of whether or not the bid is "correct" is based upon the con-
tracting officer's exercise of his error detection duty.
2 The term "responsible" is statutory. See note 24 supra. The criteria for responsibility
are set forth in the regulations. ASPR § 1-900; FPR 5 1-1.310. Generally, a determination
of responsibility is based upon consideration of the prospective contractor's (1) financial
resources, (2) ability to comply with the contract schedule, (3) record of performance,
and (4) integrity.
2 The statutory language is that the bid must conform to the invitation. See note 24
supra. A "responsive bid" is one that contains no material variances from the terms of
the invitation for bids; a bid that offers something different from what the Government
asked for in the invitation is nonresponsive. Perhaps the most frequently applied rule in
government contract law is that a substantial deviation from the invitation for bids cannot
be waived, and a bid containing such a deviation must be rejected as nonresponsive. A "sub-
stantial deviation" is defined as "one which affects either the price, quantity, or quality of
the article offered." Prestex Inc. v. United States, - Ct. Cl. -, 320 F.2d 367, 372
(1963). A contract which is awarded on a bid containing a substantial deviation from the
invitation is invalid and confers no rights on the purported contractor inasmuch as such
a contract, in effect, would be one issued without competitive bidding. United States v.
Ellicott, 223 U.S. 524 (1912); Prestex Inc. v. United States, supra; New York Mail &
Newspaper Transp. Co. v. United States, 139 Ct. Cf. 751, 154 F. Supp. 271, cert. denied,
355 U.S. 904 (1957). The justification for this sometimes harsh rule is that it is necessary
if the purposes of formal advertising are to be attained; namely, to give everyone an equal
opportunity to compete for government business, to secure fair prices, and to prevent
fraud. See Prestex Inc. v. United States, supra. The regulations do, however, permit the
waiver of minor informalities or irregularities in bids as defined therein. ASPR 5 2-405
(1963 ed. Rev. No. 3); FPR 5 1-2.405. For a general discussion of nonconforming bids,
see Navy Contract Law 55 2.27-2.32 (2d ed. 1959).
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all bids; for example, if the price or even the lowest acceptable bid
is considered unreasonable."8
Offers contained in bids are accepted by the Government by an
"award" of the contract. The only statutory requirement for an
award is that it be made by "written notice" to the bidder. 9 Most
government bid forms provide that the bid will be accepted by
mailing or otherwise furnishing a written award to the successful
bidder."0 Customarily, acceptance of the bid is made by a written
"notice of award" contained in a letter or telegram; this is followed
by a formal award document.2 ' Since the award is an acceptance of
the bid or offer, the contract comes into existence on the effective
date of the award, and the bid and the award constitute the con-
tract.2 At the present time, the federal common law is unclear with
respect to the effective date of an award of a government contract.
In the law of private contracts, the traditional rule is that a binding
contract comes into existence upon deposit of the acceptance in the
mail." However, the Court of Claims has rejected this rule and holds
that an acceptance takes effect only when it is actually communi-
21 Circumstances permitting the rejection of all bids and cancellation of the invitation
are set forth by regulation. ASPR § 2-404; FPR § 1-2.404-1. Other circumstances include
(a) where supplies or services are no longer needed, (b) deficient specifications, and (c)
collusive bids. See Navy Contract Law § 2.26 (2d ed. 1959).
29 See note 24 supra.
so This provision is found either in the bidder's agreement to keep the bid open or in
the "Terms and Conditions of the Invitation for Bids," which is part of the form. Standard
Form 21, "BID FORM (Construction Contract)" (Jan. 1961 ed.), ASPR F-I00.21, contains
this statement: "The undersigned [bidder] agrees that, upon written acceptance of this bid,
mailed or otherwise furnished within __ calendar days .... .. " (Emphasis added.)
Paragraph 8 (d) of the "Terms and Conditions of the Invitation for Bids" of both Standard
Form 30, "INVITATION AND BID (Supply Contract)" (Oct. 1957 ed.), ASPR F-100.30,
and Standard Form 33, "INVITATION, BID, AND AWARD (Supply Contract)" (Oct.
1957 ed.), ASPR F-100.33, provides: "A written award mailed (or otherwise furnished) to
the successful bidder within the time for acceptance specified in the bid shall be deemed
to result in a binding contract without further action by either party." (Emphasis added.)
There is no provision for the manner of acceptance of the bid contained in Standard
Form 19, "INVITATION, BID, AND AWARD (Construction, Alteration or Repair)"
(Jan. 1959 ed.), ASPR F-100.19.
31 Section 2-407.1 of ASPR provides that awards shall be made by mailing or otherwise
furnishing to the bidder an award document or a notice of award on such form as may
be prescribed by the procuring activity. This section does require, however, that when
a notice of award is issued it shall be followed as soon as possible by the "formal award."
In addition, § 16-101.2 (c) of ASPR expressly permits the use of informal award documents,
including telegrams, as notices of awards of supply contracts.
"See United States v. Purcell Envelope Co., 249 U.S. 313 (1919); 33 Comp. Gen.
180 (1953); 20 Comp. Gen. 530 (1941). Section 2-407.1 of ASPR provides: "All provisions
of the invitation for bids, including any acceptable additions or changes made by a bidder
in the bid, shall be clearly and accurately set forth (either expressly or by reference) in
the award document, since the award is an acceptance of the bid, and the bid and the
award constitute the contract."
m' 1 Williston, op. cit. supra note 18, at §§ 81-86. For a recent decision which followed
the traditional rule after a lengthly discussion of the views of advocates and critics of the
"rule of Adams v. Lindsell," see Morrison v. Thoelke, 155 So. 2d 889 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1963).
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cated to the offeror.' The basis for this rejection was that the change
in the postal regulations (which now allow a sender to withdraw
a letter from the mail) eliminated the rationale of the earlier cases."
The Comptroller General, however, has followed the traditional rule
that the acceptance is effective when the award is mailed." The
importance of this unresolved problem is that whichever rule is
applied could very well determine whether or not relief will be
granted in a mistake case. 7 It is suggested that since most govern-
ment bid forms prescribe the manner of acceptance,"s the award of
contracts based upon bids submitted on these forms should be effec-
tive when mailed since this is a manner of acceptance that has been
designated by the offeror."s
'Pacific Alaska Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 141 Ct. Cl. 303, 157 F. Supp. 844
(1958); Slobojan v. United States, 136 Ct. Cl. 620 (1956); Rhode Island Tool Co. v.
United States, 130 Ct. Cl. 698, 128 F. Supp. 417 (1955); Dick v. United States, 113
Ct. Cl. 94, 82 F. Supp. 326 (1949).
"For a general discussion, see Note, The Application of Common-Law Contract Principles
in the Court of Claims: 1950 to Present, supra note 19, at 776-77. See also 2 McBride &
Wachtel, op. cit. supra note 8, at § 11.30.
3835 Comp. Gen. 272 (1955). Accord, United States v. Sabin Metal Corp., 151 F.
Supp. 683 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); see also 38 Comp. Gen. 876 (1959). Language in a recent
decision, however, suggests otherwise. In Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-150461, Dec. 27, 1962,
the bidder alleged error after acceptance of the bid but before receipt of notice of award.
The decision stated: "[S]ince [the mistake] was asserted before receipt of notice of award
it is believed that to insist upon performance, under the attending facts and circumstances,
would be improper."
a7 The choice of rules could determine whether the case involved a mistake in bid or a
mistake in contract. See note 72 infra and accompanying text. For example, in one reported
decision the mistake was alleged after the award was mailed but before the award was
received. 39 Comp. Gen. 36, on reconsideration, 39 Comp. Gen. 405 (1959). The Comp-
troller General, possibly in view of the decisions of the Court of Claims (see note 34 supra),
decided the case on an alternate basis and avoided a decision on whether the acceptance
was effective when mailed or received.
as See note 30 supra and accompanying text.
asAs stated in 1 Williston, op. cit. supra note 18, at § 76: "Not only may the offeror
dictate the consideration which he demands as the return for the promise in his offer, but
he may also dictate the way in which acceptance shall be indicated." Accord, Restatement,
Contracts § 61 (1932). The bid forms are written by the Government, but when a bid is
submitted on such a form, the provisions on the form become the terms of the bidder
(offeror). The following and similar provisions found in some invitations for bids leave no
doubt as to the time procurement officials deem acceptance to be effective:
Attention is directed to paragraph 8 (d) of the Terms and Conditions of the
Invitation for Bids, which provides that a written award mailed or otherwise
furnished to the successful bidder results in a binding contract. Any award
hereunder, or a preliminary notice thereof, will be mailed or otherwise
furnished to the bidder the day the award is dated. Therefore, in computing
the time available for performance, the bidder should take into consideration
the time required for the notice of award to arrive through the ordinary mails.
However, a bid offering delivery based on date of receipt by the contractor of
the contract or notice of award (other than the contract date) will be
evaluated by adding the maximum number of days normally required for de-
livery of the award through the ordinary mails. If, as so computed, the
delivery date offered is later than the delivery date required in the Invitation,
the bid will be considered as nonresponsive and rejected.
Invitation For Bids No. 600-254-64 issued 26 Sept. 1963 by the U.S. Navy Purchasing
Office, Washington 25, D.C. at 29.
MISTAKES IN GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS
The importance of the two significant events mentioned pre-
viously-bid opening and award-relates to the period in which a
mistake may be discovered and alleged. If a mistake is discovered
before the bids are opened, the bidder has the power and right to
provide his own remedy by modifying or withdrawing the bid."' In
this Article, a mistake alleged by a bidder after opening but prior to
award is called a mistake in bid, whereas an error alleged after award
is called a mistake in contract. As discussed hereafter, the problems
involved and applicable rules vary greatly between mistakes in bids
and mistakes in contracts.
One final rule relating to the formation of government contracts
should be mentioned; namely, only duly authorized contracting
officers have authority to bind the Government in contract,4' and
then only to the extent of their actual authority."' This rule may
be particularly important in mistake cases in which issues of intent,
duty, constructive notice, and good faith are involved.
II. MISTAKES
A. General
There is probably no area of contract law in which legal labels are
more abundant or confusing than the area of mistakes. Mistakes
have been classified as unilateral and mutual, remedial and un-
remedial, palpable and impalpable, of law and of fact, and in combi-
nations thereof.4' The scope of this Article is limited to a considera-
tion of mistake cases that involve the error detection duty of con-
tracting officers. These cases involve a mistake by one party-the
bidder or contractor-that is neither induced nor shared by the
Government but for which some type of relief may be warranted."
4oSee note 21 supra and accompanying text and note 174 infra and accompanying text.
41 Bausch & Lomb Optical Co. v. United States, 78 Ct. Cl. 584 (1934).
'The doctrine of apparent authority may not be invoked against the Government
since contractors who deal with contracting officers are presumed to know their actual
authority as defined by statute or regulation. Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S.
380 (1947); United States v. Zenith-Godley Co., 180 F. Supp. 611 (S.D.N.Y. 1960);
Gay Street Corp. v. United States, 130 Ct. Cl. 341, 127 F. Supp. 585 (1955). See also 1
McBride & Wachtel, op. cit. supra note 9, at § 5.10 [3]; Mclntire, Authority of Govern-
ment Contracting Officers: Estoppel and Apparent Authority, 25 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 162
(1957).
'See Lubell, Unilateral Palpable and Impalpable Mistake in Construction Contracts, 16
Minn. L. Rev. 137 (1932); Patterson, Equitable Relief for Unilateral Mistake, 28 Colum.
L. Rev. 859 (1928).
"This type of mistake is often labeled as unilateral since the mistake was made by
only one party to the contract. If the other party to the contract knew or should have
known of the other party's mistake before the contract was consummated, the mistake
has been labeled either (a) unilateral which should be treated as mutual or (b) mutual.
See note 43 supra.
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Cases involving mutual mistakes 's or circumstances in which the
Government induces or contributes to the other party's error" will
not be discussed.
The general rule in government contract law is that if a bidder
has made a mistake in the submission of a bid that was neither in-
duced nor shared by the Government and the bid has been accepted,
the bidder must bear the consequences of the mistake unless the
contracting officer knew or should have known of the existence of
the mistake at the time the bid was accepted.47 The correlative rule
is that acceptance of a bid by a contracting officer who has either
actual or constructive knowledge of error therein does not give rise
to a valid and binding contract." This rule is founded upon principles
of good faith; that is, an "offeree will not be permitted to snap up
an offer that is too good to be true; no agreement based on such an
offer can then be enforced by the acceptor."4 In cases in which a
contracting officer has accepted a bid while on notice, either actual
or constructive, of the possibility of error in such bid, it is presumed
that the contracting officer exercised bad faith or attempted to take
" See, e.g., Ackerlind v. United States, 240 U.S. 531 (1916); Panama Power & Light Co.
v. United States, 150 Ct. Cl. 290, 278 F.2d 939 (1960); Sutcliffe Storage & Warehouse
Co. v. United States, 125 Ct. Cl. 297, 112 F. Supp. 590 (1953); Unpub. Comp. Gen.
B-148147, April 17, 1962; 30 Comp. Gen. 220 (1950). See also Unpub. Comp. Gen.
B-143861, Sept. 16, 1960, stating that the contract transaction was entered into with an
"erroneous understanding on the part of the contractor and the Government .... "
4 The Government's contribution to the mistake usually involves erroneous or mis-
leading drawings or specifications. See Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-147842, Feb. 2, 1962 (mis-
leading specifications); Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-144860, Feb. 9, 1961 (error in scale of
government drawing); Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-144262, Nov. 15, 1960 (ambiguous speci-
fications) ; 37 Comp. Gen. 532 (1958) (misprint in specification). The Government also
is liable for damage attributable to misstatements of fact in a contract or specifications
which are representations made to the contractor. See Flippen Materials Co. v. United
States, - Ct. Cl. -, 312 F.2d 408 (1963) and cases cited therein. The courts also hold
that the Government's withholding of relevant information from a contractor prior to
award is actionable as a breach of contract. Snyder-Lynch Motors, Inc. v. United States,
Ct. Cl. -. , 292 F.2d 907 (1961); Bateson-Stolte, Inc. v. United States, 145 Ct, Cl.
387, 172 F. Supp. 454 (1959); Ragonese v. United States, 128 Ct. Cl. 156, 120 F. Supp.
768 (1954).
" United States v. Sabin Metal Corp., 151 F. Supp. 683 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Saligman v.
United States, 56 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Pa. 1944); Dougherty v. United States, 102 Ct. Cl.
249 (1944); Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-138912, March 18, 1959; 20 Comp. Gen. 652 (1941).
As the court stated in Allied Contractors, Inc. v. United States, - Ct. Cl. - 310 F.2d
945, 946 (1962): "There is no doubt that plaintiff made a mistake, but there can be no
recovery unless defendant [Government] was aware of the fact that it had done so. A
contract, of course, will not be reformed for a unilateral mistake."
4' C.N. Monroe Mfg. Co. v. United States, 143 F. Supp. 449 (E.D. Mich. 1956); Kemp
v. United States, 38 F. Supp. 568 (D.C. Md. 1941); Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-151424, June
21, 1963; Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-147368, Jan. 12, 1962; 38 Comp. Gen. 678, 683 (1959);
37 Comp. Gen. 706 (1958); 36 Comp. Gen. 441 (1956).
"I Williston, op. cit. supra note 18, at § 94. See Navy Contract Law § 2.20 (2d ed.
1959); Restatement, Contracts § 71(c) (1932). See also Alabama Shirt & Trouser Co.
v. United States, 121 Ct. Cl. 313, 331 (1952) (stating that the Government could not
be charged with having snapped up an advantageous offer made by mistake); Hyde Park
Clothes, Inc. v. United States, 114 Ct. CI. 424, 435, 84 F. Supp. 589, 592 (1949).
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advantage of the bidder."5 This presumption of bad faith may be
rebutted if before award the contracting officer gives the bidder an
opportunity to review and recheck the bid by requesting the bidder
to confirm or verify the bid." If the contracting officer has fulfilled
his responsibilities in obtaining a verification of the bid," an accept-
ance of the bid ordinarily"5 will preclude relief for mistake"' unless
the contracting officer was still in fact suspicious that the bid con-
tained an error."5 The development of the federal common law has
consisted generally of an effort to prevent contracting officers from
snapping up erroneous bids without requiring them to act as a
"nursemaid" for bidders."
B. Nature Of Mistake
The legal definition of "mistake" is a state of mind that is not in
5027 Comp. Gen. 17 (1947); 23 Comp. Gen. 596 (1944); 18 Comp. Gen. 942 (1939).
The general rule is sometimes stated in these terms: "Acceptance of a bid consummates a
valid contract unless the officer accepting it was on notice, either actual or constructive,
of such circumstances as would make the acceptance an act of bad faith." Unpub. Comp.
Gen. B-138804, March 13, 1959. (Emphasis added.)
51 Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-149350, Sept. 21, 1962; Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-147341, Nov.
7, 1961; Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-138798, March 16, 1959; 36 Comp. Gen. 27 (1956);
Welch, supra note 10, at 84. The rule is usually stated in the following terms: "The fact
that the acceptance of the bid was not made until after the company had been given an
opportunity to verify its bid, precludes any assumption that the contracting officer exercised
bad faith or attempted to take advantage of the company." 27 Comp. Gen. 17, 19-20
(1947). In Alabama Shirt & Trouser Co. v. United States, 121 Ct. Cl. 313 (1952), the
court noted that the bidder had been warned of a possible mistake in its bid and stated:
"In the circumstances, we think the plaintiff cannot charge the Government with having
snapped up an advantageous offer made by mistake." Id. at 331.
" A detailed discussion of the contracting officer's duty and responsibilities in this regard
is contained in section IV of this Article infra entitled "Verification."
53 See notes 197-99 infra and accompanying text.
"Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-151735, Sept. 11, 1963; Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-149350, Sept.
21, 1962; Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-147341, Nov. 7, 1961; Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-145369,
April 11, 1961; 37 Comp. Gen. 786 (1958); 27 Comp. Gen. 17 (1947).
" See note 169 infra and accompanying text. The Comptroller General has recognized
that an award should not be made, even after verification, if the contracting officer still
suspects that the bid contains an error. In one case, relief was granted since the contracting
officer believed that he had no alternative but to make an award after the bidder's verifica-
tion of the bid; the decision stated: "In view of the contracting officer's belief that the
price quoted was erroneous, despite the verification, the contract involved may accordingly be
cancelled without liability to the company." Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-144165, Oct. 12, 1960.
In a similar decision, it was stated: "In the circumstances, to hold that the contractor is
bound by its erroneous bid when the procuring officials were suspicious of error up to and
including the time of award could hardly be regarded as an act of good faith on the part
of the Government." Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-139435, May 14, 1959. The Army Procurement
Procedures ("APP") also expressly recognizes the contracting officer's responsibility in such
circumstances: "Where the initial confirmation of a bid by a bidder does not dispel the
suspicion of an error, the contracting officer should take such further action as is reasonably
necessary to apprise the bidder of the suspected error." APP § 2-406.3 (b) (Rev. No. 26,
1960).
" In Saligman v. United States, 56 F. Supp. 505, 507 (E.D. Pa. 1944), the court said:
"I must agree with the defendant that the government is not obligated to act as a 'nurse-
maid' for bidders when the price is 'in line'."
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accord with the facts.' In contract law, however, the mental atti-
tude must be coupled with some act having legal significance before
it acquires legal consequences. 8 For the purposes of government con-
tract law, therefore, any element of an offer or bid that is based upon
a state of mind of the bidder that is not in accord with facts existing
at the time the bid is submitted apparently would be considered a
mistake. There has been little discussion by the courts or the Comp-
troller General concerning the types of mistakes or errors in gov-
ernment contract law that will provide a basis for some type of
relief, except for statements that the error or mistake must be bona
fide."' Therefore, useful guidance generally can be obtained only
from specific cases in which relief has been granted for mistake."0
There is one category of cases that has caused a great deal of con-
fusion and inconsistency in the office of the Comptroller General
with respect to whether a mistake was in fact made. This category
of cases involves a mistake of a bidder that is attributable to the
bidder's supplier or subcontractor. In Kemp v. United States,"' the
17 Restatement, Contracts § 500 (1932); 5 Williston, Contracts § 153$ (Rev. ed. 1937).
58 Russel & Pugh Lumber Co. v. United States, - Ct. C1. - 290 F.2d 938, 941
(1961); 5 Williston, OP. cit. supra note 57.
"9 See, e.g., Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-150593, Jan. 28, 1963; Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-145726,
May 12, 1961; 35 Comp. Gen. 279 (1955); 20 Comp. Gen. 286 (1940); 17 Comp. Gen. 575
(1938). This requirement apparently means only that there must be an actual or genuine
mistake honestly made. As applied, the term probably means only that the bidder or con-
tractor must be able to prove that a mistake was made. See Brister & Koester Lumber Corp.
v. United States, 116 Ct. Cl. 824, 90 F. Supp. 695 (1950), and Leitman v. United States,
104 Ct. Cl. 324, 60 F. Supp. 218 (1945), for illustrations of the type of case necessitating
this requirement.
" The following decisions illustrate the categories of mistakes for which relief has been
granted: (a) Typographical errors: Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-145726, May 12, 1961;
Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-137083, Sept. 26, 1958; 37 Comp. Gen. 654 (1958) (error
in transcribing prices from worksheets to bid form); (b) Error in computation:
Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-151963, Aug. 16, 1963; Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-149846, Oct.
30, 1962; Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-135046, Feb. 6, 1958; Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-134428,
Jan. 16, 1958; (c) Omission of cost of equipment, task, material, or labor: C.N. Monroe
Mfg. Co. v. United States, 143 F. Supp. 449 (E.D. Mich. 1956); Unpub. Comp. Gen.
B-148481, April 3, 1962; Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-146484, Aug. 2, 1961; Unpub. Comp.
Gen. B-144238, Oct. 28, 1960; 38 Comp. Gen. 504 (1959); (d) Bid based on wrong
material or equipment: Rhode Island Tool Co. v. United States, 130 Ct. Cl. 698, 128 F.
Supp. 417 (1955); Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-147090, Dec. 21, 1961; Unpub. Comp. Gen.
B-142981, Dec. 6, 1960; (e) Misinterpretation of specifications: Unpub. Comp. Gen.
B-152453, Oct. 7, 1963, Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-147647, Dec. 27, 1961; Unpub. Comp. Gen.
B-144300, Nov. 4, 1960; Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-143144, July 5, 1960; Unpub. Comp.
Gen. B-128997, Sept. 10, 1956; (f) Bid based on wrong specification: Unpub. Comp. Gen.
B-143995, Sept. 23, 1960; 37 Comp. Gen. 398 (1957); (g) Wrong unit used in computing
bid: Unpub. Cmp. Gen. B-138272, Jan. 19, 1959; Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-137297, Oct. 8,
1958; (h) Miscellaneous: Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-145192, March 16, 1961 (wrong price
due to use of obsolete catalog); Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-145027, Feb. 27, 1961 (bid was for
different procurement); Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-129514, Nov. 29, 1956 (bidder mistakenly
believed most parts could be manufactured, whereas they had to be purchased in open
market); Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-128819, Sept. 10, 1956 (bid on wrong item).
61 38 F. Supp. 568 (D.C. Md. 1941).
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contractor placed an order with its supplier after the contract was
awarded, but the supplier advised that its previous quotation (which
the contractor used in preparing the bid) was in error. The con-
tractor alleged a mistake and initially sought relief from the Comp-
troller General. The Comptroller General denied relief stating that
there was no mistake in the bid since the bid was exactly as intended
by the bidder and the acceptance was as intended by the contracting
officer." The Court of Claims, however, specifically rejected the
Comptroller General's position"8 and granted relief. The Court of
Claims previously had authorized relief for a mistake based upon a
misinterpretation of a supplier's quotation. In 1959, the Comp-
troller General expressly rejected any argument that an error at-
tributable to a contractor's supplier is not a mistake."5 Nevertheless,
the Comptroller General has denied relief in subsequent cases stating
or suggesting that there was no "mistake" in such circumstances
since the bid was exactly as intended by the bidder;"0 in other cases,
62 19 Comp. Gen. 168, 170-71 (1939).
6338 F. Supp. at 571.
" Alta Elec. and Mechanical Co. v. United States, 90 Ct. Cl. 466 (1940).
6 In 38 Comp. Gen. 517 (1959), it was stated:
While it is true that an error in a supplier's quotation is not sufficient, by
itself, to authorize relief from a contract entered into on the basis of that
quotation, the fact that the error may be due to the contractor's supplier is
not to be considered as a bar to relief if the attendant circumstances are such
that it cannot be said that the acceptance of the bid was in good faith, without
actual or constructive notice of the probability of error. The fact that the
error was made by the contractor's supplier properly can be used only as an
additional reason to show that the acceptance was in good faith in cases
where there was nothing to place the contracting officer on notice of the
probability of error. The reason for this is that the contracting officer, in the
absence of other circumstances, may not be charged with constructive notice
of the supplier's error when the contractor itself, who is a regular dealer in
such supplies, did not see fit to question the correctness of its supplier's
quotation prior to quoting such price to the Government. Id. at 519.
Similar reasoning was used in a later decision in which it was stated: "[I]f the [contractor],
well experienced in construction work, was not put on notice of probable error in the low
prices quoted . . . by its subcontractor, then certainly the Government was in no better
position to determine the correctness of the [contractor's] bid on that item. Unpub.
Comp. Gen. B-139438, May 25, 1959.
The reasoning used by the Comptroller General in the quoted statements is questionable.
First, a contracting officer is never (as indicated in the first quotation) charged with con-
structive notice of a supplier's error. The contracting officer may only be charged with
constructive notice of error in the bid submitted to the Government. Second, if the con-
tracting officer is on constructive notice of error in the bid to the Government because of
"other circumstances" (e.g., disparity in bids), his advice to the bidder of this fact in
obtaining verification may be all that would be necessary to enable the bidder to discover
the supplier's error.
0 0 Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-146386, Sept. 28, 1961; Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-146253, July
14, 1961; Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-144490, Jan. 9, 1961; Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-143802,
Sept. 1, 1960; Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-138687, March 17, 1959. If there is no "mistake"
in cases in which the amount of the bid is based upon an erroneous quotation by a supplier,
then the bidder's discovery of the error even before award theoretically would not justify
withdrawal of the bid. It is extremely doubtful that any court would permit such a result.
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relief has been granted in such situations without discussing the
point."'
The subjective approach concerning what the bidder "intended"
logically would be applicable to errors caused by misinterpretation
of the specifications or other factors involved in cases in which relief
has been granted."" This approach, however, fails to recognize that
a mistake, by definition, is a "state of mind"" and confuses the ques-
tion of whether or not a mistake occurred with the issue of whether
or not relief will be granted for the mistake." In view of the "fault"
concept of relief in government contract mistake cases,"' it is difficult
logically to reconcile why the action of a contracting officer in ac-
cepting a bid, if he has constructive notice of the possibility of error,
would be in bad faith if the error is caused by the bidder but would
be in good faith if the error was caused by the bidder's supplier.
C. Allegation Of Error
The most important factor in mistake cases is when the error is
alleged-before or after award-because this factor is used to dis-
tinguish between "mistake in bids" and "mistake in contract." Gen-
erally, a determination of what the contracting officer knew or should
have known at the time the bid was accepted also determines whether
or not any relief from the mistake is available. Thus, the importance
of when the error is alleged is apparent; if the error is alleged before
award, all questions or issues of constructive notice are immaterial
since the contracting officer has actual notice of error,' and in such
6
7 Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-148120, Feb. 27, 1962; Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-144252, Oct.
20, 1960; Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-143436, July 22, 1960. In one case, the bidder mis-
interpreted the supplier's quotation, and relief was granted. Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-146413,
Aug. 1, 1961.
68 See cases cited in note 60 supra. In one case, the Comptroller General did indicate
that error caused by misinterpretation of specifications was not a "mistake"; he stated:
"Had the contracting officer inquired if you intended to bid $.7189 per pound, your
answer could only have been that you did intend that price." Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-148412,
May 9, 1962. Nevertheless, relief was granted on reconsideration of this decision. Unpub.
Comp. Gen. B-148412, Aug. 13, 1962.
'5 See note 57 supra and accompanying text.
'"See 5 Williston, op. cit. supra note 57. In 31 Comp. Gen. 323 (1952), relief was
denied where the bidder sought a price increase because of a change (as distinguished from
an error) in its supplier's quotation. The Comptroller General stated that it was the bidder's
responsibility to get firm quotations from suppliers and that no basis for relief existed if
a supplier increases its price subsequent to the date on which the bid was submitted.
71 See note 50 supra and accompanying text.
71 See Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-144233, Oct. 25 1960 (sales case). The contractor had
verbally notified the contracting officer prior to award that the bid was in error. The
opinion stated:
Aside from any notice of error which might be imputed to the property dis-
posal officer from the unusually high bid submitted by the contractor, it is
reported that he had actual notice of the error prior to his acceptance of the
bid and award of the contract. Under such circumstances, a valid and binding
contract was not consummated by the acceptance of the contractor's bid ....
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situations, the general rule is that acceptance of the bid will not
result in a valid and binding contract. ' However, an exception to
this rule exists if the bidder is given an opportunity before award to
submit evidence of the error and he fails to submit such evidence ' or
unreasonably delays in doing so." The Comptroller General has
stated the legal effect of an allegation of error prior to award in these
terms: "In undertaking to bind a bidder by acceptance of a bid
after notice of a claim of error by the bidder, the Government virtual-
ly undertakes the burden of proving either that there was no error or
that the bidder's claim was not made in good faith. . . ."" The relief
available to a bidder when an allegation of error is made prior to
award and the evidence necessary to obtain such relief will be dis-
cussed subsequently."
In cases in which an error is alleged before award, the contracting
officer's duty or responsibility is quite simple; he requests the bidder
to submit evidence of the mistake which, together with the con-
tracting officer's report, is forwarded to higher headquarters for a
determination."' The extent of the contracting officer's responsibility
is not so clear in cases in which error is alleged after award. In these
instances, the contracting officer has no actual notice of error." It
7
"Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-147949, Feb. 2, 1962; 38 Comp. Gen. 678 (1959); 36 Conmp.
Gen. 641 (1957); 17 Comp. Gen. 536 (1937). The rule has been applied when the
bidder made no allegation of error but merely advised the contracting officer, in effect, that
he "suspected the possibility of an error" (Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-144054, Oct. 17, 1960),
and when the allegation of error was made after verification. (Unnub. Comp. Gen. B-143995,
Sept. 23, 1960). The courts have held that a bidder has a right to withdraw a bid con-
taining a mistake if the error is alleged before award. See note 174 infra and accompanying
text.
"
4 Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-146056, June 28, 1961.
75 38 Comp. Gen. 218 (1958). This case held that a period of five days after the bidder
"expressed doubt orally as to the correctness of its bid" afforded the bidder a reasonable
opportunity to allege error unequivocally and submit evidence in substantiation thereof.
But see Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-144054, Oct. 17, 1960, in which it was held that an award
should not have been made without verification after the bidder advised the contracting
officer of the possibility of error even though the bidder failed, in the ensuing eleven days
before award, to allege error.
7' 36 Comp. Gen. 441, 444 (1956).
17 See section V of this Article infra entitled "Relief."
7' ASPR § 2-406.3; FPR § 1-2.406-3.
71 If the contracting officer is, in fact, suspicious of error at the time of award (even
though error has not been alleged and the circumstances do not charge him with con-
structive notice of error), it might be argued that the contracting officer had actual notice
of the possibility of error in the bid. See note 55 supra. A situation of this type, however,
would be virtually impossible to prove unless the information was volunteered by the
contracting officer or a record was made by the contracting officer of such suspicion which
could be obtained through discovery procedures. In Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-144843, March
9, 1961 (sales case), the Comptroller General granted relief since the contracting officer had
doubts about the accuracy of the high bid and would have requested a verification if the
bidder had been present at the opening.
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is clear that the contracting officer has the responsibility to examine
all bids for mistakes,0 but beyond this essential requirement, any
determination of whether the contracting officer fulfilled his responsi-
bility (i.e., acted in good faith) involves a consideration of two
factors--constructive notice and verification.
III. CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE
A. Meaning
In the great majority of cases involving mistakes alleged after
award, the ultimate decision depends entirely upon the resolution of
one issue; namely, was the contracting officer on constructive notice
of the possibility of error at the time of award? The law of "con-
structive notice" in government contract mistake cases has been de-
veloped almost exclusively by the Comptroller General. Unfortu-
nately, most of this "law" is contained in unpublished decisions
which are not readily available to contracting officers or attorneys.
Perhaps for this reason, there has been little discussion by legal
writers of the meaning of the term, the factors or circumstances
sufficient to constitute constructive notice, or its effect. The cases
do permit a limited degree of analysis, although general rules and
criteria are not established clearly.
Generally speaking, "constructive notice" is a legal inference
drawn from established facts," or expressed another way, it is the
legal substitute for actual notice."2 As used by the Comptroller Gen-
eral, "constructive notice" in government contract mistake cases is
said to exist when the contracting officer, considering all facts and
circumstances, should have known of the possibility," probability,"4
" The procurement regulations provide: "After the opening of bids, contracting officers
shall examine all bids for mistakes." ASPR § 2-406.1; FPR § 1-2.406-1. This responsibility
also arises from application of the principle of government contract law that a contracting
officer's acceptance of a bid will be presumed to be in bad faith if he should have known
of the possibility of error in the bid.
81The Tompkins, 13 F.2d 552, 554 (2d Cir. 1926).
83 Industrial Loan & Thrift Corp. v. Swanson, 223 Minn. 346, 26 N.W.2d 625 (1947);
In re Fahle's Estate, 10$ N.E.2d 429, 431 (Ct. App. Ohio 1950).
83 For cases using the term "possible" error or "possibility" of error, see, e.g., Unpub.
Comp. Gen. B-150707, April 15, 1963; Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-150593, Jan. 28, 1963;
Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-146649, Oct. 31, 1961; Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-145144, March 21,
1961; 40 Comp. Gen. 326 (1960); Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-143942, Sept. 20, 1960; 39
Comp. Gen. 405 (1959) (also using term "probable").
84 For cases using the term "probable" error or "probability" of error, see, e.g., Unpub.
Comp. Gen. B-150902, March 12, 1963; Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-149846, Oct. 30, 1962;
Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-148079, July 12, 1962; Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-148481, April 3,
1962; 39 Comp. Gen. 36 (1959); 38 Comp. Gen. 517 (1959).
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or likelihood' that the bid contained an error." The use of words
such as "possibility," "probability," or "likelihood" apparently has
not been intended to establish any standard or degree of notice, and
the writer knows of no case in which the use of such words has been
discussed or compared. From an analytical standpoint, a contracting
officer should be charged with constructive notice of error if, in view
of the facts or circumstances, he should have known of the pos-
sibility of error in the bid. The word "probable" would suggest that
the contracting officer had made some type of evaluation because
"probable" means having more evidence for than against and is
used as a synonym for "likely."87 Since constructive notice is the
legal substitute for actual notice, a comparison should be made with
actual notice based upon allegation of error before award. It is clear
that the mere allegation of error prior to award, without submission
or evaluation of any evidence of the mistake, constitutes actual
notice of error; therefore, the use of "probable" in connection with
constructive notice seems inappropriate. In addition, the use of "pos-
sibility" is more consistent with the duty imposed by regulations."
B. Circumstances Establishing Constructive Notice
Discussion to this point has been limited to general rules and state-
ments of legal principles involving the error detection duty of con-
tracting officers. A statement of these general rules, however, does
not answer the question of the contracting officer who asks: "what
must I look for?" Nor does it answer the question that must be
answered by the lawyer, the Comptroller General, or the courts;
namely, did the contracting officer fulfill his obligation in a particular
case? As in many areas of law, answers to such questions usually must
be based upon an examination of cases in which the general rules
8"For cases using this term, see Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-150105, Nov. 6, 1962; Unpub.
Comp. Gen. B-149574, Aug. 24, 1962; Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-146314, Aug. 4, 1961; Unpub.
Comp. Gen. B-143855, Sept. 15, 1960.
" The opinions sometimes equate constructive notice to factors or circumstances which
raise a "suspicion of error" (Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-147368, Jan. 12, 1962; 37 Comp. Gen.
706 (1958)); or which are sufficient to have "indicated" the probability of error. Unpub.
Comp. Gen. B-135594, April 3, 1958. Other decisions state the contracting officer should
have had "ample reason to suspect" (Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-139897, June 26, 1959), or
might have been "alerted" to (Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-147647, Dec. 27, 1961), or "aware
of" (Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-149846, Oct. 30, 1962) the probability of error.
87See Langford v. Pearson, 334 S.W.2d 473, 476 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960) error ref.
n.r.e.; Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Carrell, 318 S.W.2d 744, 748 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958) error ref.
n.r.e.
88 The regulations direct that a contracting officer shall obtain a verification of a bid in
cases in which he "has reason to believe that a mistake may have been made." ASPR §
2-406.1; FPR § 1-2.406-1 (Emphasis added.) The word "possible," of course, is defined
as that which may occur (neither probable nor impossible). See Webster, New International
Dictionary of The English Language 1927 (2d ed. 1956). The Comptroller General has,
in fact, equated this requirement of the regulations to notice of the possibility of error.
Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-147113, Sept. 28, 1961.
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have been applied to specific facts and circumstances. Therefore,
this section will discuss specific factors and circumstances which, it
has been held, should have alerted the contracting officer to the pos-
sibility of error in a bid.
In competitive procurements, the part of the bid or proposal pre-
pared by the bidder generally is limited to price since the Govern-
ment specifies what it wants, the quantity, the required delivery
schedule, and the general provisions of the proposed contract. Con-
sequently, nearly all factors or circumstances which may be a basis
for constructive notice involve the amount of the bid.
1. Errors Apparent on the Face of the Bid There is probably only one
category of cases in which it is clear that a contracting officer is
charged with constructive notice of error; namely, if it is apparent
from an examination of the bid itself that the bidder has made an
error. The most obvious example of this situation is a discrepancy
between the unit price and the total price; i.e., the unit price multi-
plied by the total number of units to be delivered under the con-
tract does not equal the total amount bid. This situation is so com-
mon, in fact, that a specific provision generally is included in the
invitation for bids providing that if the bid contains a variance
between the unit price and the extended price, the unit price will
govern."s Such a provision does not, however, eliminate the con-
tracting officer's error detection duty if such a variance does exist.
The Comptroller General's position in this regard has been stated as
follows:
Although the invitation does provide that in case of error in extension
of price in the bid the unit price will govern, it is our opinion that such
provision should only be applied, without requesting verification, where
the correction results in a relatively minor change in the extended price
or where the circumstances indicate that the unit price actually repre-
sents the intended price. ... "
S Paragraph 1 (c) of the "Terms and Conditions of the Invitation for Bids" in both
Standard Form 30, "INVITATION AND BID (Supply Contract)" (Oct. 1957 ed.),
ASPR F-100.30, and Standard Form 33, "INVITATION, BID, AND AWARD (Supply
Contract" (Oct. 1957 ed.), ASPR F-100.33, provides: "Unit price for each unit bid on
shall be shown and such price shall include packing unless otherwise specified. A total shall
be entered in the Amount column of the Schedule for each item bid on. In case of error
in extension of price, the unit price will govern." (Emphasis added.)
90 37 Comp. Gen. 829, 830 (1958). Accord, Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-147317, Dec. 6, 1961;
Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-145505, June 21, 1961. The Comptroller General had stated pre-
viously, 36 Comp. Gen. 429, 431 (1956):
[Ilt is well established that a bid cannot be considered as having been accepted
in good faith if an error in the bid is so apparent that it must be presumed
that the contracting officer knew of the mistake and sought to take advantage
of it. That principle would be for application regardless of any statement
made in the Government's invitation for bids or in its accompanying docu-
ments concerning possible errors such as discrepancies between unit prices
and extended total amounts. . ..
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Other examples of errors apparent on the face of the bid include
obvious errors in placing a decimal point,"' obvious discount errors, 9
a lower price f.o.b. destination than for f.o.b. origin, 3 and obvious
errors in the designation of the unit. 4 All of these examples are
specified in the regulation.s
2. Disparity in Bids The factor or circumstance most frequently
considered in questions of constructive notice is the inference, if any,
that may be drawn from a comparison of the bids received. In other
words, the difference between the amount of the low bid and the
amount of the next low bid (and possibly all other bids) may be
sufficiently large as to suggest the possibility of error in the low bid.
It is the comparison of bids which is important here, although
emphasis of this point has led to statements suggesting that a con-
tracting officer cannot be charged with constructive notice if only
one bid is received because there is no basis for comparison." Similar
reasoning has been used if only two bids are received: "[O]rdinarily
no fair comparison with other bids can be made where only two
widely variant bids are received, there being no more reason for con-
sidering the low bid too low than for considering that a mistake was
made by the high bidder in quoting a price too high." ' The quoted
statement may be correct, but it is believed that the conclusion drawn
from the statement-that the contracting officer should not be
charged with constructive notice of error in such circumstances-is
clearly erroneous. The statement itself implies that a variance be-
tween the amounts bid does suggest that one of the bids is in error;
the lack of constructive notice is due to the fact that there are no
9' 17 Comp. Gen. 339 (1937); see also 17 Comp. Gen. 817 (1938).
92 17 Comp. Gen. 493 (1937). The example of an obvious discount error given in the
regulations is "1 per cent 10 days, 2 per cent 20 days, 5 per cent 30 days." ASPR §
2-406.2; FPR § 1-2.406-2.
9316 Comp. Gen. 999 (1937); see also 17 Comp. Gen. 817 (1938).
9417 Comp. Gen. 841 (1938).
a
5
ASPR § 2-406.2; FPR § 1-2.406-2.
"See, e.g., Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-146413, Aug. 1, 1961; 26 Comp. Gen. 415 (1946).
In fairness, such statements are usually qualified by the word "ordinarily." These state-
ments, even as qualified, may be misleading inasmuch as there are many situations in which
a contracting officer may be on constructive notice of error even though only one bid is
received. For example, relief was granted in one case in which only one bid was received
which was on the basis of f.o.b. destination. It was held that the contracting officer should
have suspected error in view of the fact the contractor had, for the past three years,
consistently bid f.o.b. origin at the same unit prices it intended to offer in the bid. Unpub.
Comp. Gen. B-149138, June 29, 1962. Similarly, a contracting officer was charged with
constructive notice since only one bid was received but the amount of such bid was only
76% of the Government's estimate of the cost of procuring the equipment. Unpub. Comp.
Gen. B-148325, March 23, 1962.
9720 Comp. Gen. 286, 288 (1940). Accord, Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-150593, Jan. 28,




other bids to indicate which bid is in error. This reasoning overlooks
the fact that the contracting officer's error detection duty relates
only to the low bidder and that the high bidder will not be adversely
affected if its bid is erroneous.98 In short, if the variance does in
fact suggest that one of the bids is in error, the contracting officer
certainly should be charged with notice of the possibility of error in
the low bid.99 Can the contracting officer in good faith accept the low
bid without verification on the basis that there is a fifty per cent
chance the bid is correct? It has never been questioned, of course,
that a contracting officer may be charged with constructive notice
of error in the low bid, even if only two bids are received, if other
factors are present."'
It is difficult to generalize with respect to the significance to be
drawn from a comparison of bids. For example, the "range" of all
bids may be as important as the difference between the low bid and
the next low bid. The fact that all bids except the low bid were in
a narrow range has been noted specifically as significant in finding
the contracting officer was on constructive notice of error."' The
contrary implication could arise if the amount of the difference be-
tween the low bid and the next low bid is no greater than the differ-
ences between the other bids received; i.e., if there is a wide range
in the prices received.0 ' In one case concluding that the contracting
officer was on constructive notice of error, the Comptroller General
noted that the difference between the amounts of the low and the
next low bid was significantly more than the average difference be-
gs This statement would not apply, of course, to cases involving the disposal of govern-
ment Prooerty (i.e., sales cases) in which the duty is to the high bidder, and in such cases
it is the low bidder who would not be adversely affected.
99See note 88 supra and accompanying text. The Comptroller General has, in fact, so
held. In Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-147090, Dec. 21, 1961, it was stated that the disparity
between the low bid and "the other bid received" indicated "a certainty that a gross error
had been made." In Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-144172, Oct. 17, 1960, it was held that the
disparity between the amount bid by the contractor for an item not awarded to the con-
tractor and the amount bid for such item in the only other bid received was constructive
notice of error.
100 Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-149846, Oct. 30, 1962 (variance between low bid and govern-
ment estimate); Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-143942, Sept. 20, 1960 (other bidder was brand-
name manufacturer); Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-143436, July 22, 1960 (shipping weights
stated in low bid indicated erroneous interpretation of specifications).
I' In one case, the Comptroller General noted that the low bid of $1,024.15 was more
than $358 lower than the next low bid, while "the three other bids received were closely
in range there being a difference of only $57 between them." Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-147647,
Dec. 27, 1961.
10 5See Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-146314, Aug. 4, 1961; Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-138804,
March 13, 1959.
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tween any two of the other sixteen bids."0 3 In view of the wide range
in prices customarily received in cases involving the sale of govern-
ment salvage or surplus property, a disparity in bids normally would
not have the same significance as would a like difference in prices
quoted on new equipment or supplies to be furnished to the Gov-
ernment.1' The reason for such conclusion is that prices offered to
the Government for its surplus property are based more or less upon
the use to which the property is to be put by the particular bidder
or upon the risk of resale which the bidder might wish to take.'"
There certainly is no reason, however, why a disparity in the amounts
of the bids received should not place the contracting officer on con-
structive notice of error if, under the particular circumstances, a
reasonable person would have suspected the possibility of error.
The cases do not permit any generalization with respect to
the amount of disparity that will be sufficient to give the con-
tracting officer constructive notice of the possibility of error in the
low bid. For example, it has been held that the contracting officer
was on contructive notice of error although the second low bid ex-
ceeded the low bid by less than eight per cent;10o on the other hand,
relief has been denied even though the disparity was over forty per
cent.0 " In some cases, relief has been granted when the low bid and
the next low bid both were out of line with the other bids received.1°
Many factors properly could be considered in determining the
amount of disparity which should alert the contracting officer to
the possibility of error in a particular procurement. The nature of
the item (specially manufactured or "off the shelf" with known
market prices), the condition of the economy and even of' the par-
ticular industry, the experience of the bidders generally, and the
customary degree of competition among suppliers of the item all
1l3Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-148481, April 3, 1962. In another case, a contractor sug-
gested that the contracting officer should have been on constructive notice of error since
the average price of all bids was higher than his bid. The logic in the Comptroller General's
reply is difficult to criticize: "Any time a low bid is excluded and an average is computed
from a group of bids, all of which are higher, the average of the higher bids must, of
necessity, be higher than the low bid." Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-148412, May 9, 1962
(relief granted on reconsideration in opinion dated Aug. 13, 1962). The average of all
bids other than the low bid may be significant if the disparity between the low bid and
such average is sufficiently great. See C.N. Monroe Mfg. Co. v. United States, 143 F.
Supp. 449 (E.D. Mich. 1956); Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-90669, Nov. 23, 1949.
1
°4Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-148642, April 25, 1962; Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-144230, Oct.
26, 1960; Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-144229, Oct. 19, 1960; 28 Comp. Gen. 261 (1948).
10"United States v. Sabin Metal Corp., 151 F. Supp. 683, 689 (S.D.N.Y. 1957);
Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-148642, April 25, 1962.
0OeUnpub. Comp. Gen. B-148412, Aug. 13, 1962.
107 17 Comp. Gen. 373 (1937).
'0' C.N. Monroe Mfg. Co. v. United States, 143 F. Supp. 449 (E.D. Mich. 1956);
Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-144300, Nov. 4, 1960.
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might be considered in such a determination. Finally, the difference
between the low and the next low bid may not, by itself, be sufficient
for constructive notice, but such difference coupled with one or
more of the other factors discussed hereafter may very well be
sufficient.
3. Government Estimate It is customary in competitive procurements
for the Government to prepare, for its own use, an estimate of the
probable cost of the supplies or services. One purpose of this "gov-
ernment estimate" is to assist the contracting officer in determining
whether the prices in the bids submitted are reasonable." 9 The gov-
ernment estimate also is an important factor in the error detection
duty of the contracting officer; it frequently has been cited as the
determinative factor in finding that the contracting officer should
have known of the possibility of error in cases in which only two
bids were received in response to the invitation. 1 The element of
notice, of course, involves the disparity between the amount of the
low bid and the amount of the government estimate. This disparity
alone may be sufficient to charge the contracting officer with con-
structive notice; 11 it often is combined with other factors for such
purpose."' A disparity between the amount of the low bid and the
government estimate may not be significant if the amounts of several
other bids also are below the government estimate. 1' In a recent
case, the Court of Claims held that the contracting officer was not
on constructive notice of error in the low bid, even though the
amount in the next low bid for one item was almost two and one-
half times the amount for such item in the low bid, because the
difference between the amount in the low bid and the government
estimate for such item was not significant.""
0 See note 28 supra and accompanying text.
11°See, e.g., Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-149846, Oct. 30, 1962; Unpub. Comp. Gen.
B-146124, Sept. 1, 1961; Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-144018, Sept. 29, 1960.
11Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-148325, March 23, 1962. In this case only one bid was re-
ceived; therefore, this was the only factor available.
112Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-i51663, July 17, 1963 (additional factor was disparity in
bids); Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-137690, Nov. 20, 1958 (additional factor was difference in
amount of bid and amounts of prior procurements); see also cases cited in note 110 supra.
sia Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-150073, Nov. 13, 1962. But see Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-148120,
Feb. 27, 1962, in which relief was granted based upon the contracting officer's statement
that he should be charged with constructive notice of mistake because of his failure to
give "full weight" to the government estimate since the second low bid was also "consider-
ably less" than the government estimate.
'Allied Contractors, Inc. v. United States, - Ct. Cl. -, 310 F.2d 945 (1962).
There were several alternative justifications for the court's conclusion. It would seem that
a reasonable person would suspect the possibility of error in both the low bid and the
government estimate in a situation in which they were "in line" with each other but were
considerably lower than the other bids. Logically, the situation is the same as if the low
bid and the next low bid are both out of line with the other bids. See note 108 supra and
accompanying text.
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The discussion of the government estimate in Frazier-Davis Constr.
Co. v. United States"' is misleading. In that case, the amount of the
low bid was considerably below the amount of the government esti-
mate. The low bidder was awarded the contract and later sued the
Government alleging that certain material facts had been withheld
by the Government which resulted in the plaintiff making a gross
error in its bid. One of the "material facts" was the amount of gov-
ernment estimate. The court said, however, that the Government was
under no obligation to disclose the amount of the government esti-
mate to bidders and that to do so would tend to destroy competi-
tion."'6 The court undoubtedly was correct insofar as its statement
relates to disclosure of the amount of the government estimate before
the bids are opened. But it is believed that its conclusion is erroneous,
and the reasons therefor inapplicable, with regard to disclosure of the
amount of the government estimate after the bids are opened."' The
court did not discuss whether or not the contracting officer should
have suspected the possibility of error in view of the disparity be-
tween the low bid and the amount of the government estimate.
The importance of the government estimate is illustrated by the
cases holding that, in effect, a contracting officer may be charged
with constructive notice of error in the low bid because of an
erroneous government estimate. Relief in these cases has been author-
ized in situations in which it was concluded that the contracting
officer would have obtained a verification of the low bid if the gov-
ernment estimate had been correct or even more accurate."1 The
result of these cases is difficult to reconcile with the "fault" concept
of relief for mistakes; i.e., the issue of good faith on the part of the
contracting officer. Some cases of this type might be better explained
on a theory of mutual mistake in, that both the bidder and the Gov-
ernment were mistaken as to the scope or amount of the effort
required."'
15 100 Ct. Cl. 120 (1943).
"'Id. at 162-63.
.17 The competitive bidding system would not be prejudiced by such disclosure after
bids are opened since the bids can neither be modified nor withdrawn after such time. The
duty to disclose information to bidders after bids are open is discussed in section IV of
this Article infra entitled "Verification."
118 Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-149283, Dec. 26, 1962; Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-147702,
March 13, 1962; Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-147580, Nov. 21, 1961. Relief was denied in one
case involving such a situation, but the case is distinguishable by the Comptroller General's
statement that there was no clear and convincing evidence of error. Unpub. Comp. Gen.
B-146253, July 14, 1961.
"'See Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-143861, Sept. 16, 1960. In this case, both the contractor's
bid and the Government's estimate for reglazing windows were computed on the basis of
the building containing 1,350 windows. After award it was discovered the building had
6,750 windows, and the government estimate was increased from $5,464 to $24,384. The
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4. Prior Procurements Another factor which may be sufficient to
alert the contracting officer to the possibility of error in the low
bid is a comparison of the bid with the prices paid in the past for
the same or similar items. As stated by J. E. Welch, now Deputy
General Counsel, GAO:
Another criterion which has been considered and used by the GAO in
determining whether the contracting officer should have suspected
the probability of error in a bid is whether he had estimated a sub-
stantially different price for the procurement or had knowledge of a
prior record of purchases for the same or similar items at substantially
different prices... ."' (Emphasis added.)
The comparison of the bid with the prior procurements may be
sufficient, without more, to charge the contracting officer with con-
structive notice of error; 12 1 more frequently, such a comparison is
in addition to other factors."'2 A comparison of the low bid with
prior procurements may be the determining factor if the disparity
in bids alone would be insufficient for constructive notice.21 Similarly,
in one case a contracting officer was not charged with constructive
notice even though there was a significant disparity in the amounts
of the low bid and the other bids received because the low bid was
in line with previous procurements.
124
One decision of the Comptroller General in 1959 cast considerable
doubt upon the relationship of prior procurements to constructive
notice by suggesting that differences between a low bid and the
Comptroller General authorized relief since "the contract transaction was entered into with
the erroneous understanding on the part of both the contractor and the Government that
there were no more than 1,350 windows to reglaze."
'"Welch, Mistakes in Bids, supra note 10, at 83.
'1 In Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-1 50902, March 12, 1963, the contractor's price was $21.00
per unit for blood. The contractor alleged error in that it did not notice that, because of
a change in the specifications from prior procurements, it was obligated to furnish the
containers for each unit of blood. It was held that the contracting officer was on constructive
notice of error in view of three prior procurements under which the contractor had bid
the same price although the Government furnished the containers. In Unpub. Comp. Gen.
B-149138, June 29, 1962, the only bid received was submitted by the sole supplier of the
item. After award, the contractor alleged it had not intended to bid on f.o.b. destination
basis. The Comptroller General first noted that the contractor, in the past three years,
had "consistently bid f.o.b. origin at the same unit prices it says it intended to offer on
this contract" and thereafter concluded that the contracting officer should have entertained
sufficient doubt as to warrant an inquiry.
122 Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-143144, July 5, 1960 (dispartiy in bids); Unpub. Comp.
Gen. B-138272, Jan. 19, 1959 (disparity in bids and value of item); Unpub. Comp.
Gen. B-137690, Nov. 20, 1958 (bid also out of line with government estimate); Unpub.
Comp. Gen. B-137221, Sept. 8, 1958 (should have known bidder's item did not meet
specifications); Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-129514, Nov. 29, 1956 (bid out of proportion to
value of equipment).
'" Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-137139, Sept. 9, 1958.
'
24 Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-146264, Aug. 18, 1961. Compare note 114 supra and accom-
panying text.
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prices paid under prior procurements would not be sufficient to put
a contracting officer on notice of error.'" On reconsideration, how-
ever, this view was modified considerably by the statement that
contracting officers are not required to "give great weight to the
details of bids received four years previously for the same item but
for different quantities to ascertain the reasonableness of the prices
quoted. . . ."" Even this statement is misleading in view of the cases
holding that the amounts paid under prior procurements may be an
important or even determining factor in constructive notice.
A comparison of current prices with the prices paid under prior
procurements is particularly significant in evaluating proposals under
negotiated procurements. The regulations state that some form of
price analysis should be made in connection with every procurement
action in order to determine the reasonableness of the prices quoted.
Moreover, a comparison of prior quotations or contract prices with
current quotations for the same or similar items is one form of
analysis specifically suggested."' Since the very purpose of price
analysis is to determine the reasonableness of proposals, a significant
disparity between the amount of the current quotation and the prior
contract prices undoubtedly should, in the absence of unusual cir-
cumstances, constitute constructive notice to the contracting officer
of the possibility of error. One other point should be mentioned in
connection with evaluation of proposals in negotiated procurements.
Contractors submitting proposals frequently are required to submit
a government form entitled "Cost and Price Analysis, ' '.. which is
a detailed breakdown of the cost elements of the proposal. In addi-
tion, the form requires an identical breakdown of the actual unit
cost under the contractor's previous contract. With such detailed
information available, it is doubtful that a person submitting a pro-
posal could make any significant error without placing the con-
tracting officer on constructive notice of such possibility. In addition,
the specific elements of the actual unit cost of the prior contractor
may alert the contracting officer to the possibility of error in the
amount proposed by a different contractor for such item.
5. Value or Market Price If the item to be furnished to the Govern-
1239 Comp. Gen. 36, 38 (1959). The decision stated: "[W]e do not believe that
knowledge of price differences as may have existed with respect to prior procurements
should be imputed to a contracting officer in evaluating bids in a situation such as here
involved where the spread of bid prices would not have put him on notice of probability
of error....
120 39 Comp. Gen. 405, 407 (1959).
"17 ASPR § 3-807.2(b) (1) (ii); FPR 5 1-3.808-2(b).
12 Department of Defense Form 633, "COST AND PRICE ANALYSIS" (1 April 1959
ed.), ASPR S F-200.663.
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ment has a market price or reasonable value that the contracting
officer knows or should know and if there is a significant difference
between the amount of the low bid and such market price or value,
the contracting officer certainly should be alerted to the possibility of
error in the bid. It may be extremely difficult to prove that the item
did have a market price or value of which the contracting officer
knew or should have known. However, upon such proof, the logical
conclusion must be that the contracting officer was on constructive
notice of the possibility of error. The Comptroller General has ob-
served in several decisions, as an additional reason for concluding the
contracting officer was on constructive notice, that the amount of
the bid was disproportionate with the value of the item.2
Two cases warrant limited discussion on this point. In the first, 0
the low bid (thirty-five dollars each for flood lights) was "out of
line" with other bids and past procurements of the item. The bidder
verified the price and also that its unit met specifications. After
award, however, the bidder alleged error in that it mistakenly believed
most parts could be manufactured, whereas they had to be purchased
in the open market. The Comptroller General granted relief on the
basis that the contracting officer was on constructive notice of error
at the time of award because the bidder's price was "out of proportion
to the value of the equipment" and because the contracting officer
"should have realized that a bidder intentionally would not offer to
furnish the flood light covered by the invitation for $3 5 per unit .... "
The second case'3' involved a procurement of a certain number of
pieces of steel conduit (two and one-half inches in diameter and
approximately ten feet in length). A purchase order was issued on
the basis of an alleged quotation of one dollar and fifteen cents for
each piece. The contractor delivered and billed at a rate of one dollar
and fifteen cents per foot. In granting relief, the Comptroller General
said: "[T]he Government's purchasing agent should have realized
that a steel conduit, 2 'A" thick, 10' long, with coupling attached,
could not be profitably furnished at $1.15 each, notwithstanding the
existence of the Government's estimate of $0.50 each. . . ." The
reasoning of these cases should also apply if the contracting officer
should have known of a market price for the item.
"'See Unpub. Comp Gen. B-147317, Dec. 6, 1961; Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-144018,
Sept. 29, 1960; Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-137690, Nov. 20, 1958; Unpub. Comp. Gen.
B-90669, Nov. 23, 1949; see also Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-138272, Jan. 19, 1959, in which
the purchasing agent reported that he knew that the item could only be purchased for
approximately four times the amount of the low bid.
130 Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-129514, Nov. 29, 1956.
.. Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-144834, Feb. 2, 1961.
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6. Miscellaneous The cases that do not fit into any specific category
provide the best insight with regard to the circumstances under which
a contracting officer may be charged with constructive notice of
error. Furthermore, these cases illustrate that the error detection
duty of a contracting officer involves more than a cursory examina-
tion of the bids and is, in fact, a challenging responsibility.
One situation which now seems firmly established as constituting
constructive notice of error is that in which the bid of a non-
manufacturer is lower than a bid from a manufacturer of the item."'
Although this circumstance probably occurs infrequently, it is diffi-
cult to imagine a situation more suggestive of error. The Comptroller
General also has suggested in at least two cases that the contracting
officer should have known from experience that only one manu-
facturer (who was not the bidder) could furnish an item meeting
the specifications."'
In a recent case, the Comptroller General stated that the disparity
in bids alone was insufficient to constitute constructive notice of
error; however, another bidder wrote to the contracting officer before
award suggesting that the low bidder must have interpreted the
specifications differently in view of the low price. The Comptroller
General held that this warning, together with the disparity in bids,
was constructive notice of the possibility of error."'
If the low bid is "out of line with itself," another interesting cir-
cumstance of constructive notice is present. For example, in one
case the amount bid for one size box was more than the amount bid
by the same bidder for a larger and stronger box;" in another case
the identical unit price was bid for two items of paint, one of which
was more expensive than the other.'6 Similarly, the amount bid for
certain items may be "out of line" with the amount submitted for
other items by the same bidder because of quantity or size.1"' Another
bid was sufficiently "out of line with itself" to place the contracting
officer on notice of the possibility of mistake in the bid because of
"'2Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-150707, April 15, 1963 (bid of nonmanufacturer f.o.b.
destination was same amount as manufacturer's bid f.o.b. origin); Unpub. Comp. Gen.
B-149228, Aug. 1, 1962; Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-145192, March 16, 1961; Unpub. Comp.
Gen. B-143942, Sept. 20, 1960. In an earlier decision, the Comptroller General indicated
that this fact might not "in and of itself" be sufficient to place the contracting officer on
notice of a possible mistake in bid. Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-137139, Sept. 9, 1958. See
also Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-145369, April 11, 1961, in which the contracting officer fulfilled
his duty by pointing out to the low bidder that its bid was lower than prices quoted by
manufacturers.
'338 Comp. Gen. 517, 521 (1959); Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-137221, Sept. 8, 1958.
"' Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-151963, Aug. 16, 1963.
1" Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-147656, Dec. 12, 1961; 37 Comp. Gen. 654 (1958).
"3637 Comp. Gen. 398 (1957).
'' Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-128819, Sept. 10, 1956.
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contradictory information in sales literature submitted with the
bid. 3' In another case, it might be said that the low bid was "out
of line" with a previous bid of the same bidder inasmuch as the
contracting officer was charged with constructive notice of error
because the low bidder had bid the identical amount a short time
previously under less costly specifications, whereas the only other
bidder increased its price significantly over the prior bid."89 A dis-
parity between the shipping weights used by two bidders was cited
in one case as a factor of constructive notice. "' One final case con-
tains interesting implications. The contractor alleging mistake was
a small business concern and the Comptroller General made the
following statement concerning constructive notice:
[T]he contractor's prices for the items delivered from the east coast
to the west coast are lower than the prices bid by the big business
suppliers on the west coast. Therefore, the contracting officer should
have suspected an error and verified the prices prior to making an
award. 4
The geographical location and size of the bidder together were
noted as an additional basis for constructive notice. Would these
two be sufficient for constructive notice without other factors?
Could either item alone ever constitute constructive notice?
C. Effect of Constructive Notice
The legal effect of constructive notice occurs only at or after
award of the contract. By definition, constructive notice exists if
the contracting officer should have known of the possibility of
error. If the contracting officer has accepted a bid even though he
should have known of the possibility of error, it is presumed that
he acted in bad faith and sought to take advantage of the bidder.
From a practical standpoint, however, it is the prospective applica-
tion of the principles contained in the cases involving constructive
notice that is beneficial. Stated differently, the cases suggest cir-
cumstances to the contracting officer in which he should suspect
the possibility of error. When such circumstances exist, the error
detection duty of the contracting officer continues and he must
515Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-146649, Oct. 31, 1961. The bid enclosed a "schedule of
discounts" which stated a commercial list price higher than the amount in the bid.
189Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-147368, Jan. 12, 1962. In a similar case, the contracting
officer was charged with constructive notice because, in addition to a disparity in bids, the
low bidder had submitted two previous quotations at nearly the same price for furnishing
two items less than required by the subsequent quotation. Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-149429,
Aug. 2, 1962.
140 Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-143436, July 22, 1960.
14137 Comp. Gen. 654, 655 (1958).
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attempt to obtain a verification of the bid from the bidder. This
duty arises from two sources: first, such action is specifically re-
quired by regulation;1. second, it arises by implication from the
principle that acceptance of a bid without such action is pre-
sumed to be in bad faith; that is, the opportunity to recheck the
bid given to the bidder by the request for verification rebuts the
presumption of bad faith.
Any such simple statement of the contracting officer's duty is
misleading. The contracting officer's request for verification must
be adequate or sufficient under criteria established in the cases. The
legal effect of a contracting officer's acceptance of a bid after an
inadequate or insufficient verification is the same as if no request
for verification had been made; namely, it is presumed that such
acceptance was in bad faith. There has been little written concern-
ing the contracting officer's responsibility in requesting verification;
unfortunately, many honest and conscientious contracting officers
simply do not appreciate the existence of any such responsibility,
much less its extent.
IV. VERIFICATION
A. General Requirement
The federal common law relating to mistakes in contracts origi-
nated, for practical purposes, with the case of Kemp v. United
States.' In the Kemp decision, the court granted relief on the basis
that the Government knew or should have known of an error in
the bid at the time of its acceptance. An important qualification
to the Kemp doctrine later was expressed by the Court of Claims;
namely, the contracting officer cannot be charged with having
acted in bad faith if the bidder was given an opportunity to re-
check and confirm the bid. " This qualification was the contract-
ing officer's panacea and led to the common practice, which still
exists in many procurement offices, of automatically requesting
the low bidder in every procurement to verify its price. This re-
quest for verification normally was made by telephone and was
considered as merely another procedural step in the award of a
contract. The low bidder usually was requested to confirm the
142 ASPR § 2-406.1; FPR § 1-2.406-1. This requirement of the regulation was noted
in a recent decision of the Comptroller General. Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-1173$, Sept. 11,
1963.
143 38 F. Supp. 568 (D.C. Md. 1941).




telephonic verification by wire or letter. This action, often prompted
by no more than an item on a clerk's check list, generally was
considered to preclude any possibility of relief to the contractor
inasmuch as such action rebutted any presumption that the ac-
ceptance was in bad faith.
This "good faith by check list" ended, however, with the lead-
ing case of United States v. Metro Novelty Mfg. Co." This decision
is the basis of the requirement that the request for verification
must be adequate or sufficient, and it also established the initial
test in this regard. The importance of the opinion in this case is
belied by its length, which is two short paragraphs. The facts
of the case, although not recited in detail in the opinion, are
available from two sources-a prior unpublished decision of the
Comptroller General""6 and the official records of the court.' The
significance of this decision and the fact that the sources mentioned
are not readily accessible necessitates that the facts be set forth in
detail.
B. The Metro Case
The United States Marine Corps invited bids-to be opened
December 3, 1947-for furnishing a quantity of gilt cap ornaments
(Item 5) and a quantity of gilt collar ornaments (Item 6) for de-
livery to Philadelphia and San Francisco. The following bids were
received in response to the invitation:1'
Bidder Unit Price Per Item
5(a) 5(b) 6(a) 6(b)
Metro $ .060 $ .060 $ .108 (pair) $ .108 (pair)
No. 2 .140 .142 .230 (pair) .240 (pair)
No. 3 .151 .152 .288 (pair) .290 (pair)
No. 4 .440 .440 .360 .360
The contracting officer called the president of Metro and asked: (a)
what equipment the firm had; (b) what experience the firm had
1" 12S F. Supp. 713 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
144 Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-75179, June 4, 1948.
141 United States v. Metro Novelty Mfg. Co., Civil Action No. 87-153, United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York. There was no dispute over any of
the facts involved; the case was, in fact, decided on cross motions for summary judgment.
14 Abstract of Proposals [sic], Exhibit "J" to Affidavit of Robert W. Sweet filed with
Notice of Motion for Summary Judgment, United States v. Metro Novelty Mfg. Co., supra
note 147.
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in producing the item; and (c) that the bid be verified.' The presi-
dent of the bidder verified the bid by letter providing as follows:
This is to confirm our telephone conversation of this date regard-
ing our bid on requisition No. 1823 for collar ornaments in which we
quoted the price of $.054 each. The price per set of one left and one
right is $.108. Again we wish to assure that we are equipped and ex-
perienced in manufacturing this type of item and are certain that we
can supply you with an excellent product and meet delivery dates."'
The bid of Metro was accepted on all items, and the company ac-
knowledged receipt of the contract on December 29, 1947.
By letter dated March 24, 1948, Metro wrote to the General Ac-
counting Office, alleged that a mistake had been made in its bid, and
requested an increase in the contract price. The company alleged
that, in preparing its bid, all costs of die work, tool work, overhead,
and profit were omitted, and a miscalculation had been made with
reference to the weight of the metal involved."' The Comptroller
General denied relief stating: "The fact that the acceptance of the
bid was not made until after the company had been afforded an
opportunity to verify its bid, precludes any assumption that the con-
tracting officer exercised bad faith or attempted to take advantage
,1V1of the bidder....
The Contractor thereafter failed to perform, and the contract was
terminated for default. The Government reprocured the uniform
ornaments and sued Metro for the excess cost. The court granted
Metro's motion for summary judgment saying:
Cross motions are presented for summary judgment. Plaintiff seeks
to recover $12,000 damages from defendant for its failure to carry
out a $6,000 bid for uniform ornaments. Defendant claims a mis-
take in the computation of the bid. Plaintiff admits that the error was
so gross that it was placed on notice. It further admits that the only
consequence of defendant's failure to perform was the acceptance of
the second lowest bid and that there was no damage to the government
from the delay in execution which resulted from defendant's participa-
tion in the bidding.
4 Affidavit of Joseph Millman, United States v. Metro Novelty Mfg. Co., supra note
147. The opinion of the Comptroller General, see note 146 supra, states that the request
for verification related only to items 6(a) and (b) (collar ornaments). This fact is sup-
ported by the actual verification received from the bidder. See note 150 infra and accom-
panying text.
... Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-75179, June 4, 1948.
... Ibid. The reason for the mistake is explained in paragraph "NINTH" of Defendant's
Answer in the Metro case, supra note 147. It was alleged that the company's employee
"customarily entrusted with figuring prices" was mentally and physically unable to perform
his job because (unknown to the company) he was suffering from a serious stomach ailment
and was under medical care and sedation.
152 Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-75179, June 4, 1948.
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Plaintiff's purchasing agent sought to avoid the force of Kemp v.
United States, D.C. Md. 1941, 38 F. Supp. 568, by telephoning the de-
fendant and asking for a 'verification' of the bid and by having it
'confirmed' by telephone and letter from defendant's president. Plain-
tiff, however, did not put defendant on notice of the mistake which it
surmised. Reaffirmation of the bid under these circumstances does not
bar the defense of rescission. ' (Emphasis added.)
Thus, the first test or standard for the adequacy or sufficiency of a
verification was established-did the request for verification put the
bidder on notice of the mistake which the contracting officer sur-
mised?"5 4 Consequently, we now have a "qualitative test" to apply
to the action of the contracting officer in requesting verification.
C. Application Of Metro Principle
The language of the court in the Metro decision assumes, it is be-
lieved, an essential element of a request for verification. The decision
expressly requires that the bidder be placed on notice of the mistake
which the contracting officer surmised; this, however, impliedly re-
quires that the bidder be placed on notice that the contracting officer
surmises a mistake. In other words, the contracting officer at the
very minimum should specifically advise the bidder of the purpose of
the request for verification; namely, that he suspects the possibility
of a mistake in the bid. This requirement has now been recognized
... United States v. Metro Novelty Mfg. Co., 125 F. Supp. 713, 714 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
" The court undoubtedly meant that the contracting officer failed to notify the bidder
that a mistake was suspected in view of the disparity between the amounts of the low bid
and the other bids received. This conclusion is supported by the pleadings (paragraph
"TENTH", Defendant's Answer) in which Metro took the position that the contracting
officer had notice of the error because of the "great disparity" between its bid and the
other bids received. It is also supported by the court's statement that Plaintiff admitted
the error was so gross that it was placed on notice. There is an ironic possibility, however,
that (in this of all cases) the contracting officer did in fact advise the bidder of the
mistake he surmised. This is merely conjecture of the writer, but the circumstantial evidence
is fairly strong. First, the amount of Metro's bid on items 6(a) and (b) was (notwith-
standing the contrary statement of the Comptroller General) $.108 per pair and not $.054
per unit (this is supported by paragraph 3 of the Plaintiff's Amended Complaint and by the
Abstract of Bids, see note 148 supra). The contracting officer, looking at the abstract of
bids, probably surmised that Metro's bid of $.108 per pair was in error and should have
been $.108 each (or $.216 per pair, which would not have been grossly out of line with
the other bids). If so, it is natural to assume that the contracting officer called the bidder
and asked if its bid on items 6(a) and (b) was per unit or per pair, which was exactly
the error the contracting oflicer surmised. This would explain why, as stated by the Comp-
troller General, the request for verification related only to items 6(a) and (b). Such an
assumption is supported strongly by the wording of Metro's letter of verification (see note
150 supra and accompanying text). If the writer's guess is accurate, the contracting officer
did put Metro on notice of the error he actually surmised. This suggests an interesting
question: If a contracting officer puts the bidder on notice of the mistake which he actually
surmises, is the verification insufficient if the contracting officer fails to advise the bidder
of circumstances from which the possibility of error should have been suspected?
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by the Comptroller General.'55 It has been concluded, and properly
so, that the failure to point out why the request for verification is
made actually misleads the bidder into believing that his bid is "in
line" with the others, 5
After the purpose of the request is explained to the bidder, the
contracting officer must, as stated in the Metro case, put the bidder
on notice of the mistake which he surmises. The specific language
used by the court in the Metro case is unfortunate inasmuch as a con-
tracting officer seldom suspects a specific mistake. Occasionally, the
nature of a specific mistake is suspected; for example, in one case
a bidder bid the same unit price for three-inch tape as it did for two-
inch tape, but this fact was not specifically called to the bidder's
attention in the request for verification. It was held that the request
should have asked the bidder to verify that he intended to bid an
identical price for both sizes of tape."' In another case, the request
for proposal for a computer also required thirty items of spare parts.
In reviewing the low proposal, technical experts advised the con-
tracting officer that the amount in the proposal for spare parts was
low as compared with the government estimate and that the differ-
ence probably reflected the omission of the "main logic board." The
company verified by telephone and wire that its price for spare parts
covered all thirty items. It was held that the request for verification
was insufficient since the bidder was not specifically advised of the
15 In Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-144252, Oct. 20, 1960, the contracting officer had tele-
phoned the low bidder and requested confirmation of price and delivery schedule and inquired
if the bidder was a small business and contemplated using government-owned equipment.
The decision stated:
The Purpose of requiring Price confirmation and other information was not
explained to [the bidder]. In view of all the information that was being re-
quired, the bidder could have easily construed the request merely as an attempt
to perfect the understanding between the parties instead of as notice of possible
error. In these circumstances, we conclude that the telephone request for
verification was not adequate to put the bidder on notice that an error was
suspected and to afford it a sufficient opportunity to check its quotation.
Therefore, we are of the opinion that the purported acceptance of the bid did
not result in a valid, binding contract. . . . (Emphasis added.)
Similarly, in Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-142810, July 20, 1960, the buyer called the bidder on
another matter and suggested he recheck his figures. The Comptroller General said:
No indication was given [the bidder] that there was doubt as to the correctness
of his bid. [The bidder] explains that from prior dealings he understood the
suggestion to recheck his figures as a request as to whether or not he could low-
er his bid and that he did not re-figure the bid since he felt that the bid which
had been submitted was at a minimum. In these circumstances, it is not
believed that such request can properly be considered as a request for verifica-
tion of the bid. . . . (Emphasis added.)
15' Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-134428, Jan. 16, 1958. Accord, Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-137288,
Oct. 31, 1958. Note also how the bidders misunderstood the purpose of the request for
verification in the quotations in note 155 supra, One reason for this, it is believed, is the
common practice of a pro forma request for verification.
"' Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-136024, May 15, 1958.
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probability that the price of the main logic board had been omitted."'5
The Comptroller General also held a request for verification insuffi-
cient because the contracting officer failed to advise the bidder that
he surmised that the bid was based on material meeting only one of
the two applicable specifications. "'
In the majority of cases, however, the contracting officer merely
notices some circumstance, such as a disparity in bids, from which
he suspects that the low bidder possibly made a mistake. This is
important because the contracting officer in such cases actually sus-
pects the effect of a mistake-an erroneous price-and does not
suspect or surmise the nature of the mistake. Consequently, it is
believed that the holding of the Metro case would be expressed more
accurately by a statement that a request for verification is insufficient
if the contracting officer fails to put the bidder on notice of the
reasons why a mistake is surmised. Although this view has never been
stated expressly by the Comptroller General, decisions of his office
are consistent with the view. The most illustrative cases are those
involving some type of "disparity." It is clear that the disparity
between the low bid and the next low bid, the government esti-
mate, or prior procurements is not of itself a mistake; it is merely
the result of an erroneous price and the reason why a mistake is
suspected. A request for verification was held inadequate, however,
because the contracting officer failed to call the bidder's attention
to the wide disparity between the amount of its bid and the dis-
proportionately higher prices quoted by each of the other bidders
for the same services."' The contracting officer's responsibility is well
illustrated by a case in which the bid of the low responsive bidder
was generally "in line" for the lowest quantity but was consider-
ably lower with respect to the higher quantities. The Comptroller
1 Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-144238, Oct. 28, 1960.
15935 Comp. Gen. 136 (1955). This was the mistake which had been alleged by an-
other bidder. The decision does not indicate that the contracting officer actually suspected
the low bidder made a mistake. The decision, therefore, possibly implies that an allegation
of a specific mistake by one bidder may put the contracting officer on notice of the nature
of a possible mistake by another bidder which should be pointed out to such other bidder
in requesting verification. In 37 Comp. Gen. 786, 788-89 (1958), the Comptroller General
made this statement with respect to this case: "Our decision reported at 35 Comp. Gen.
136, is clearly distinguishable since, in that case, the contracting officer failed to put the
bidder on notice of a specific mistake surmised as to the interpretation of the specifications
of the invitation .. " Compare note 134 supra and accompanying text.
80 Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-134428, Jan. 16, 1958. The basis of another decision, Unpub.
Comp. Gen. B-129514, Nov. 29, 1956, is not clear, but the contracting officer's report to
the Comptroller General recommended relief since the bidder was not specifically advised
of the prices paid under two previous procurements. See also Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-137221,
Sept. 8, 1958, which held the request for verification inadequate and suggested that the
reason it was inadequate was because the bidder was not advised of the disparity between
the low bid and last year's price for the same item.
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General held that the request for verification was inadequate since
the particular disparity was never specifically brought to the bidder's
attention even though the abstract of bids had been made available
to the bidder for inspection. It was stated:
When, as in this situation, the contracting officer suspects error he
should specifically advise the bidder of the exact nature of the error
suspected and request verification. When he fails to do so an attempted
award on the basis of the bid as submitted containing the suspected
error is invalid. . .. 'a
The view that it is the reason why the contracting officer suspects a
mistake (rather than the mistake suspected) which should be pointed
out to the bidder also is illustrated by cases holding that the request for
verification was sufficient. For example, the request for verification
was adequate in a situation in which the bidder (a dealer) was
advised that his bid was lower than that of a manufacturer."' Verifi-
cation also was adequate in an instance in which the bidder was
advised that its bid was so far below the next lowest bid as to raise a
suspicion in the contracting officer's mind as to the possibility of
mistake."'
A contracting officer obviously cannot notify the bidder of a spe-
cific mistake surmised if he has no idea what the mistake may be; i.e.,
if he merely surmises that some type of mistake may have been made.
In such cases, the only possible way for a contracting officer to dis-
charge his duty is to advise the bidder of the reason he suspects a
mistake. This is illustrated by a case in which the contracting officer
advised the low bidder that its bid was "considerably lower" than
the next lowest bid and of its right to request relief because of a
mistake in bid. The Comptroller General held that the contracting
officer's notice to the bidder of the disparity in bids complied with
the criteria of the Metro case since "that was the full extent of the
contracting officer's knowledge, there being nothing in the invitation
or bid from which he could have guessed at the nature or source
of error."'" (Emphasis added.) The emphasized language is an excel-
lent "test" for compliance with the standard required by the Metro
case. If the very purpose of the request for verification is to establish
the good faith of the contracting officer, can the request itself be in
6'aUnpub. Comp. Gen. B-142981, Dec. 6, 1960. In Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-144718,
April 10, 1961, the request for verification was inadequate inasmuch as the contracting
officer noted a disparity between low and next low bid on one of three items in the bid,
but he merely requested the bidder to verify the total amount of the bid.
1'2Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-145369, April 11, 1961.
163 Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-147341, Nov. 7, 1961.
1"37 Comp. Gen. 786, 788 (1958).
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good faith if less than a full disclosure is made to the bidder of all
facts or circumstances which have led the contracting officer to sus-
pect the possibility of error? The answer to this question is found
in a recent case which held that a bidder is not given an opportunity
in a "complete sense" to verify its bid unless the contracting officer
brings "the entire factual situation" to the bidder's attention. 5' It
is submitted that the appropriate test for the adequacy of a request
for verification ordinarily is whether or not the bidder was put on
notice of all facts or circumstances which suggested or should have
suggested the possibility of mistake to the contracting officer.
In some circumstances, it has been held that the contracting
officer's duty is not exhausted by compliance with the Metro stand-
ard. One line of decisions indicates that, in cases of obvious or sus-
pected gross mistake, the contracting officer must do more than
make a full disclosure to the bidder. One case indicates that, in such
a situation, the request for verification should indicate clearly that
the bidder has been requested to recheck the details and recompute
its quotation. 6' The Comptroller General has also held a verification
inadequate, even though the bidder was advised that its bid was ex-
tremely low, because the bidder was not "apprised of the fact that the
disparity was so tremendous as to indicate a certainty that a gross
error had been made in submitting the bid so that it would feel
impelled to recompute its bid completely..... It was also held that
a contracting officer should have requested "further clarification"
prior to award and investigated the bidder's capabilities, even after
verification, because the low bid was "completely out of line" with
sixteen of the seventeen other bids received.' "' These cases are similar
to the decisions indicating an acceptance is not in good faith, even
after verification, if the contracting officer is still suspicious of error
at the time of award. "'
165 Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-149282, Aug. 7, 1962. See also Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-132076,
June 27, 1957, in which it was stated that the Government, in requesting verification,
"must give the bidder sufficient facts to put him on notice of the mistake surmised, if the
subsequent acceptance of the bid is to result in a valid contract ....
166 Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-139435, May 14, 1959.167 Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-147090, Dec. 21, 1961. In Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-152604,
Oct. 18, 1963, the Comptroller General held that "the contractor should have been advised
before making the contract award that the disparity in bids [more than 50%] was so
tremendous as to indicate a certainty that a gross error was made in its bid.
"e Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-144300, Nov. 4, 1960.
'9 Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-144165, Oct. 12, 1960; Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-139435, May
14, 1959; 35 Comp. Gen. 136 (1955). In Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-129514, Nov. 29, 1956,
the decision stated that the contracting officer, at the time of award, "apparently was not
convinced" that the bidder understood the Government's requirements or the significance
of the request for verification. This language certainly suggests that the contracting
officer must take such action as may be necessary to impress upon the bidder the full
implications of the verification of the bid. A recent decision, Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-152453,
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D. Effect Of Adequate Verification
The legal effect of a bidder's verification usually depends, as dis-
cussed previously, upon the nature and content of the contracting
officer's "request" for verification. The contracting officer must ex-
pressly disclose all facts to the bidder which may be suggestive of
error. This requirement does not adversely affect the Government
because the bidder cannot withdraw or change the bid without sub-
mitting satisfactory proof of a bona fide mistake. The Government's
disclosure in a request for verification merely gives the bidder an
opportunity to recheck its bid for mistake; it does not give the bidder
an election to accept or reject the award.'
If full disclosure is made to the bidder when verification is requested
prior to award, the contracting officer generally cannot be charged
later with acting in bad faith. In discussing the error detection
duty of a contracting officer in one case, the Comptroller General
stated:
Such duty was completely discharged when the contracting officer made
inquiry of [the low bidder] as to the accuracy of his company's bid,
pointing out the difference between the company's bid and the other two
bids and the Government's estimate of the project, which amounts were
given to the bidder; calling specific attention to the omission of item
No. 21A on the Unit Price Schedule and advising him that the com-
pany would have to, take that item at no charge, or that it could
allege an error; and, also specifically calling attention to the com-
pany's low bid price of $.55 per cubic yard for excavation for items
Nos. 2, 3, 18, and 19, and 30, and requesting if that was the correct
price ....
A contracting officer who makes such a complete disclosure and who
gives the bidder a reasonable time to verify the bid 72 is under no
obligation to make further inquiry as to the correctness of the bid
unless he is still in fact suspicious of error. It is stated generally that
the opportunity given to the bidder by an adequate request for verifi-
cation precludes any assumption of bad faith or arbitrary action and
that the contracting officer would be derelict in his duty if he failed
thereafter to make the award to the low bidder."" If the contracting
Oct. 7, 1963, suggests that a contracting officer's duty is not discharged if, after verification,
he still should have been suspicious of error. The Comptroller General held that the
contracting officer "should have given the contractor a further opportunity to discover the
error in its bid" although the contracting officer pointed out, in his initial request for
verification, that the low bid was approximately 236 percent lower than the next low bidder.
170 See note 184 infra and accompanying text.
1 Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-138798, March 16, 1959.
172 37 Comp. Gen. 706 (1958).
.. Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-151735, Sept. 11, 1963; Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-147341, Nov.
7, 1961; Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-145369, April 11, 1961; Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-144697,
Jan. 24, 1961; 37 Comp. Gen. 786 (1958).
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officer has completely discharged his duty prior to making the award,
the contractor generally is thereby precluded from obtaining any
relief based upon a mistake.
V. RELIEF
There are several unique rules relating to the relief available for
mistakes made in connection with government contracts. These rules
will be mentioned briefly in order that the contracting officer's duties
may be considered within the proper framework and that proper
emphasis be directed to when the error is alleged-before or after
award.
A. Mistakes In Bids
If an error is alleged before award of the contract, relief may con-
sist of either correction or withdrawal of the bid. In cases in which a
bidder discovered and alleged a mistake before award, the courts have
recognized that the bidder has a right to withdraw the bid, notwith-
standing the general rule concerning withdrawal of bids." 4 The exist-
ence of a mistake necessarily must be proved prior to withdrawal or
correction. However, only "reasonable proof"'' of the existence of
the mistake is necessary to justify withdrawal, and, as a practical mat-
ter, it may not even be necessary to meet this burden." The Comp-
troller General has held that the disparity between the amounts of the
low bid and the next low bid itself created a presumption. of error
or is prima facie evidence of mistake.' It is clear, therefore, that a
bidder who makes a bona fide mistake in its bid and alleges error before
award should have little difficulty justifying the request for with-
"4 United States v. Lipman, 122 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1954); Rhode Island Tool Co.
v. United States, 130 Ct. Cl. 698, 128 F. Supp. 417 (1955); Alta Elec. & Mechanical Co.
v. United States, 90 Ct. Cl. 466 (1940). Compare Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-151424, June 21,
1963, in which it was stated, "[I]t has been a long-standing practice in federal procurement
to permit withdrawal of a bid upon convincing proof of error therein." (Emphasis added.)
For the general rule concerning withdrawal of bids, see note 19 suPra and accompanying
text.
17'35 Comp. Gen. 279, 281 (1955).
170 See note 76 supra and accompanying text.
'77 17 Comp. Gen. 575, 576 (1938).
178 17 Comp. Gen. 416, 418 (1937). In 28 Comp. Gen. 403 (1949), the disparity in
bids alone was sufficient evidence of error to permit withdrawal. This type of proof seems
to be based on "bootstrap logic"; i.e., using the fact of the difference in price as proof
of the reason for the difference in price. This type of proof, however, frequently is con-
sidered. See, e.g., Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-144074, Oct. 4, 1960; Unpub. Comp. Gen.
B-143995, Sept. 23, 1960; Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-138272, Jan. 19, 1959. The standards
imposed by regulation require "clear and convincing" evidence of mistake in order for
withdrawal to be authorized by the procuring agency. ASPR § 2-406.3 (a) (1); FPR §
1-2.406-3 (a) (1). This standard is difficult to reconcile with the position of the Comp-
troller General.
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drawal of the bid. However, more difficulty is encountered in correct-
ing an erroneous bid.
In order to justify correction of a bid, the existence of the mistake
must be established and conclusive evidence submitted establishing
the amount of the intended bid."" In addition, if the correction of
the bid would affect the rights of other bidders-such as by displacing
the low bidder-the amount of the intended bid must be ascertainable
substantially from the invitation and the bid itself without resorting
to work papers or other extraneous evidence. ° The requirement for
conclusive evidence of the amount of the intended bid is reasonable.
If a bidder is permitted to withdraw his bid, all other bidders remain
in the same position in which they would have been if such bidder
never had submitted a bid. Correction of a bid, if permitted upon less
than conclusive evidence of the amount of the intended bid, could
seriously compromise the integrity of the competitive bidding system
and would certainly open the door to fraud.
The matter of correcting a bid raises a problem relating to the na-
ture of the mistake that is unique in government contract law. The
problem is this: can a bid which is not responsive'.. to the invitation
be corrected based upon an allegation that the reason for the bid being
nonresponsive was an oversight or a mistake? The Comptroller Gen-
eral's position is that it cannot, and his reason is as follows:
It is probable that the majority of unresponsive bids are due to
oversight or error, such as the failure to quote a price, to sign the
bid, to furnish a bid bond, to submit required samples or data, or the
submission of the wrong sample, incomplete data, or statements the
actual meaning of which was not intended, etc. An unresponsive bid
does not constitute an offer which may properly be accepted, and to
permit a bidder to make his bid responsive by changing, adding to, or
deleting a material part of the bid on the basis of an error alleged
after opening would be tantamount to permitting a bidder to submit
a new bid. . 192
Consequently, it is now settled that an allegation of error properly
may be considered only in cases in which the bid is responsive to the
invitation and is otherwise proper for acceptance.' 8'
17935 Comp. Gen. 279, 281 (1955). In 38 Comp. Gen. 76, 78 (1958), the Comptroller
General said that correction has been permitted only if the evidence submitted establishes
"beyond all doubt" the actual intention of the bidder. In these circumstances, it seems that
the "clear and convincing" evidence requirement in the regulation is less than the degree
of proof required by the Comptroller General. See note 178 supra.
180 37 Comp. Gen. 210 (1957). This requirement also is imposed by regulation for
administrative determinations. ASPR § 2-406.3 (a) (3) ; FPR § 1-2.406-3 (a) (2).
1s1 See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
18238 Comp. Gen. 819, 821 (1959).
"'
9 Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-147884, Aug. 8, 1962; 40 Comp. Gen. 432 (1961); 40
Comp. Gen. 132 (1960); 38 Comp. Gen. 819 (1959).
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A recent case raised another unique problem: if a bidder alleges
and establishes that its bid contains an error, but is unable to prove
the amount of the intended bid in order to warrant correction, can
the bidder thereafter "waive" its right to withdraw the bid and re-
ceive the award? The Comptroller General held that such right could
not be waived and that the bid properly should be disregarded in
making the award."'4 The basis of the decision was that it would be
unfair to other bidders to permit a low bidder to receive the award
after an unsuccessful attempt to obtain an increase in price by reason
of mistake. It was stated, however, that such action would not be
prejudicial to other bidders provided the evidence is clear and con-
vincing that the low bidder would have remained low if the mistake
had not been made.
B. Mistakes In Contracts
If allegation of error is not made until after the contract has been
awarded, the form of relief available to the contractor is, generally,
either correction of the error or cancellation of the contractor's obli-
gation. The discussion in this part will cover several important limita-
tions with respect to relief available for mistakes in contracts. One
initial matter should be mentioned; statements frequently are found
in decisions indicating that the bidder's carelessness or negligence in
computing the bid precludes any relief for mistake. "' It is submitted
that such statements should be inapplicable to mistake cases in govern-
ment contract law. There usually is some degree of negligence or
carelessness involved in every mistake, and a criterion based upon the
relative quantity or degree of negligence is highly impractical. More-
over, any such limitation is inconsistent with the fault concept of
relief for mistakes in government contracts; that is, there is no basis
logically for denying relief because of carelessness if the contracting
officer is presumed in law to have acted in bad faith and sought to take
advantage of the bidder.
One important problem concerns the contractor's execution of a
formal contract or performance after allegation of error as affecting
the contractor's right to relief for mistake. Many cases suggest that
184 Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-151424, June 21, 1963. See also Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-151534,
June 14, 1963, in which a bidder's protest of the rejection of its bid, after a determination
was made that the evidence did not warrant correction, was denied. Compare 35 Comp.
Gen. 363 (1955) (sales case) which held that the bid could be corrected, since the error
and the intended bid were established, but that the bidder had no right to withdraw its bid.
.. See, e.g., Hyde Park Clothes, Inc. v. United States, 114 Ct. Cl. 424, 84 F. Supp.
589 (1949); Massman Constr. Co. v. United States, 102 Ct. Cl. 699, 60 F. Supp. 635,
cert. denied, 325 U.S. 866 (1945); Nason Coal Co. v. United States, 64 Ct. Cl. 526 (1928);
Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-134591, Dec. 23, 1957.
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such action precludes any relief for mistake,' 6 but other cases suggest
to the contrary."8 7 In the present state of the law, a contractor takes
a substantial risk in undertaking or continuing performance of a con-
tract after error has been discovered and alleged. There is an excep-
tion, however, if the contracting officer assures the contractor that
the bid will be corrected."8' This writer believes that any limitation
upon the available relief for mistakes because of execution or per-
formance of the contract is both inappropriate and unnecessary. It
is inappropriate since it tends to encourage-indeed, compel--con-
tractors to delay performance until the legal issues are resolved, and
such delays are not in the public interest if they are unnecessary to
protect the Government's rights. The delays are unnecessary in view
of the other limitations discussed hereafter. An acceptable rationale,
it is suggested, would be that the contracting officer's insistence upon
performance and delivery after allegation of error is coercive and
should not bar relief if it is subsequently determined that the con-
tractor would have been legally justified in refusing to perform."8"
1'Board of Trustees of Nat'l Training School for Boys v. O.D. Wilson Co., 133
F.2d 399 (D.C. Cir. 1943); Massman Constr. Co. v. United States, supra note 185; Unpub.
Comp. Gen. B-146386, Sept. 28, 1961; 39 Comp. Gen. 27 (1959); 38 Comp. Gen. 218
(1958); Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-134166, Nov. 27, 1957; 36 Comp. Gen. 191 (1956); 31
Comp. Gen. 384 (1952); 26 Comp. Gen. 426 (1946); 25 Comp. Gen. 536 (1946).
.8. C.N. Monroe Mfg. Co. v. United States, 143 F. Supp. 449 (E.D. Mich. 1956);
Rhode Island Tool Co. v. United States, 130 Ct. Cl. 698, 128 F. Supp. 417 (1955);
Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-147090, Dec. 21, 1961 (performance and execution of a supple-
mental agreement); Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-146124, Sept. 1, 1961; Unpub. Comp. Gen.
B-146413, Aug. 1, 1961; 38 Comp. Gen. 504 (1959); Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-138272,
Jan. 19, 1959; Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-135594, April 3, 1958.
188 In Edmund J. Rappoli Co. v. United States, 98 Ct. Cl. 499 (1943), the court held
that the signing of the contract did not preclude relief for a mistake previously made if
the contracting officer assured the bidder that the mistake "could be corrected" if submitted
through proper channels. The court, in effect, enforced the Government's promise to
correct the mistake.
"'See Albert & Harrison, Inc. v. United States, 107 Ct. Cl. 292, 68 F. Supp. 732
(1946), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 810 (1947), in which the court held that action of the
Government in threatening to forfeit the bid bond if the bidder failed to sign the contract
was coercive in a situation in which the Government had no right to have the bidder sign
the contract. See also Russ Mitchell, Inc. v. United States, 121 Ct. Cl. 582 (1952). In
one decision, the Comptroller General said that a claim for mistake should not be denied
because of execution and performance of the contract since the contractor "was influenced
in his decision to accept the contract by the advice given by [the contracting officer] that
withdrawal of the bid would result in the forfeiture of the bid bond .. " 38 Comp. Gen.
678, 684 (1959) (Emphasis added.) This situation is somewhat analagous to the controversy
in Dillon v. United States, 140 Ct. Cl. 508, 156 F. Supp. 719 (1957). In that case, the con-
tractor had sought to be relieved from contract performance because of severe weather con-
ditions, but the contracting officer insisted upon performance and advised the contractor that
he would be charged with the excess cost upon reprocurement if it became necessary to
terminate for default. The court granted relief to the contractor for the additional cost in-
cured in performance, stating:
The choice which the contracting officer gave [plaintiffs] was somewhat like the
choice sometimes given the cattle thief who might be captured by a group of
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
In any event, performance and delivery prior to the discovery of
error should not affect relief.
The Comptroller General has expressed in several cases that a
contract price may be increased by correction of a mistake only if
the amount the bidder actually intended to bid can be ascertained;
in other words, a bidder cannot be permitted to recalculate and
change his bid to include factors which he did not have in mind
when his bid was submitted or as to which he has since changed his
mind. " ° It has been stated, "[T]o permit this would reduce to a
mockery the procedure of competitive bidding required by law in
the letting of public contracts.'. 1 Although this reasoning undoubt-
edly is sound as applied to mistakes in bids, it is highly questionable
if applied to correction of a bid after the contract has been awarded.
Moreover, it is illogical to prohibit an increase in the price for pros-
pective application yet permit such increase to be made retroactively,
in effect, by authorizing relief after performance on the basis of
unjust enrichment. "9 It certainly does not seem in the best interest
of the Government to require cancellation, and thus presumably
incur cost of reprocurement, merely because a fair price to the con-
tractor may require the inclusion of elements of cost which were not
considered at the time the bid was submitted. It would seem that
the interest of the Government is protected adequately by the fol-
lowing limitation.
Another limitation frequently applied to relief in mistake cases
is that the total amount recovered by the contractor may not exceed
the amount of the next low correct bid.19 The Comptroller General's
basis for this limitation is as follows:
The rationale for limiting relief to the next lowest correct bid is that
the contracting officer is bound by mandatory provisions of law . . .
to make the award to the lowest responsible bidder and, therefore, had
no authority to bind the Government to other than the lowest cor-
rect bid price received.'"
citizens on the frontier in the early days. The story goes that one such rustler
was taken in the act. The enraged owners gave him the choice of whether he
be 'hung or shot.' After studying the matter over, he replied that he could not
develop any enthusiasm for either method." Id. at 511-12, 156 F. Supp. at 721.5
"Unpub. Camp. Gen. B-148481, April 3, 1962; 37 Comp. Gen. 706 (1958); 17
Comp. Gen. 575 (1938).
191 17 Comp. Gen. 575, 577 (1938).
" See, e.g., C.N. Monroe Mfg. Co. v. United States, 143 F. Supp. 449 (E.D. Mich.
1956); Rhode Island Tool Co. v. United States, 130 Ct. Cl. 698, 128 F. Supp. 417 (1955);
Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-145142, March 16, 1961 (restitution after rescission on basis of the
reasonable value of full performance); 38 Camp. Gen. 504 (1959).
19 Rhode Island Tool Co. v. United States, supra note 192; Unpub. Camp. Gea.
B-150707, April 15, 1963; Unpub. Gen. B-149283, Dec. 26, 1962; 37 Camp. Gen. 685
(1958).
1937 Camp. Gen. 685, 686 (1958).
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One weakness of this argument is that the provision of law requiring
that award be made to the lowest responsible bidder.. s is not con-
ditioned upon the bid being correct; therefore, the same reasoning
would support an argument that relief could never be granted for
mistake since the contracting officer has no authority to bind the
Government in an amount in excess of the low bid, even if such
bid were erroneous. In view of the basic theory for any relief-that
the contracting officer acted in bad faith and sought to take ad-
vantage of the bidder-it would seem that the primary consideration
should be that the contractor receive a fair price for the goods or
services. Of course, the amount of the next lowest bid usually would
be the best measure of a fair price. Thus, it is believed that the next
low bid more properly should be used as a measure of, rather than a
limitation upon, relief.""
Brief mention should be made of one additional category of cases
involving relief for mistakes. These cases involve situations in which
the contracting officer completely discharged any responsibility he
may have had to the contractor, but relief is permitted, nevertheless,
on the basis of hardship or that it would be unconscionable to require
performance. As stated by the Court of Claims:
[T]he general rule is that difficulty of performance or losses in carry-
ing out a contract will not be treated as a basis for relief by the
courts .... But in extraordinary cases where extreme hardship, unfore-
seen and not contemplated by either party, would necessarily result, a
measure of relief may be granted if the unusual circumstances justify
such action. This is the very essence of equity . ... '"
Although the Comptroller General often states that he has no author-
ity to grant relief on this basis,"" he frequently does.'
195 See note 24 supra.
I" Accord, C.N. Monroe Mfg. Co. v. United States, 143 F. Supp. 449 (E.D. Mich.
1956); Shepard v. United States, 95 Ct. Cl. 407 (1942). This position is also consistent
with the cases in which the Comptroller General has authorized relief in excess of the next
low bid. See, e.g., Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-137297, Oct. 8, 1958.
7 Dillon v. United States, 140 Ct. Cl. 508, 512-13, 156 F. Supp. 719, 722 (1957).
This case, however, did not involve a mistake by the contractor; the contract was for
supplying hay to the Government and the hardship resulted from a severe drought.
'"See, e.g., Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-144251, Oct. 28, 1960; Unpub. Comp. Gen.
B-142981, July 13, 1960.
l. Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-I50382, Feb. 20, 1963; Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-148775, July
24, 1962; Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-146413, Aug. 1, 1961; Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-145806,
June 12, 1961; see also Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-144300, Nov. 4, 1960; Unpub. Comp. Gen.
B-143861, Sept. 16, 1960. In Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-152453, Oct. 7, 1963, it was stated:
"It would not only be inequitable to require performance at the contract price but it




Contracting officers should be held to high standards in the exercise
of their obligation to examine bids for errors and obtain a verifica-
tion if the possibility of error is suspected. This is desirable from a
standpoint of federal procurement policy as well as for reasons of
fairness to bidders. The contracting officer's error detection duty
must be exercised, if at all, prior to award of the contract, and the
chances of an allegation of error subsequent to award are reduced
appreciably if prior to award the contracting officer makes a full
and frank disclosure to the bidder of all factors which may suggest
the possibility of error. It is certainly to the advantage of both the
Government and the bidders if an allegation of error can be con-
sidered and resolved before award and thus before either party has
changed positions. In addition, the equities involved in requiring the
mistaken party to assume the risk of mistake in government con-
tract law are quite different from the circumstances in the law of
private contracts. ' " In view of the possible financial detriment to
a bidder who has made a mistake, the burden placed upon a con-
tracting officer by his error detection responsibilities is insignificant,
and strict enforcement of such error detection duty is justified. This
is particularly true because the duty can be discharged completely
in most situations merely by an adequate request for verification
of the bid.
The principles applied in the decisions of the Comptroller General
in mistake cases are consistent with a requirement of high standards
for contracting officers in the exercise of their error detection duty.
However, the application of these principles to specific factual situa-
tions in such decisions is not always consistent with such a re-
quirement. This result is at least partially attributable to what
may be termed a "subjective" approach with respect to the contract-
ing officer's report; namely, the consideration given to the con-
200 Government contracts have been classified as an excellent example of a "contract of
adhesion," (Whelan & Pearson, Underlying Values in Government Contracts, 10 J. Pub. L.
298, 331-32 (1962)); that is, an agreement drafted by a dominant party and presented to
a weaker party as the only acceptable instrument (Shuchman, Consumer Credit by Adhesion
Contracts, 35 Temp. L.Q. 125, 128 (1962)). The favored position of the Government in
contract, as compared with a private citizen, is illustrated by such standard government
contract clauses as "Changes," "Default," "Disputes," "Suspension of Work," and "Termi-
nation for Convenience." In addition, legal doctrines such as estoppel, apparent authority,
and laches may not be applied against the Government in the same manner that they are
applied against individuals. Not only does the Government have sovereign immunity from
suit (except in those instances and to the extent it has consented to be sued), but it also has
successfully defended suits for breach of contract on the basis that the actions complained
of were taken by the Government in its "sovereign" rather than its contractual capacity.
It should also be observed in this connection that the profits of one party are not subject to
"renegotiation" after performance under the law of private contracts.
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tracting officer's conclusion concerning whether or not he was on
constructive notice of error at the time of award." ' It is suggested
that such an approach is analogous to considering the opinion of a
defendant in a tort case on the question of negligence. The con-
tracting officer's statement of whether or not he was in fact suspicious
of error at the time of award is most important, but a determination
of whether or not he should have been suspicious of error properly is
made upon consideration of the facts and circumstances-an "objec-
tive" approach-and not upon consideration of the contracting
officer's opinion.
In closing, it should be observed that the federal common law
relating to mistakes in government contracts has developed rapidly
in the last few years. It is extremely doubtful that some of the older
court decisions based upon the harsh no-duty-to-nursemaid-bidders
concept would be decided with the same result today. Nevertheless,
these decisions remain as obstacles to further progress and develop-
ment in this field. There could be no more appropriate time than the
present for one or more scholarly and analytical court opinions in
this area.
'0' An example of statements frequently found in decisions of the Comptroller General
is as follows: "It was stated in the letter of July 27, 1962, that the Contracting Officer
did not believe that the low bid was so out of line with the other bids as to constitute
constructive notice of error requiring him to request verification before award .. "
Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-149574, Aug. 24, 1962. Similarly, in another decision it was said:
"[T]he contracting officer has stated that he did not notice anything about the bid which
would indicate that an error might have been made." Unpub. Comp. Gen. B-148726, May
22, 1962. It is certainly objectionable to give any weight to such a conclusion as a basis
for denying relief. In fairness, however, it should be noted that the Comptroller General
also has used the contracting officer's conclusion as a basis for granting relief. In Unpub.
Comp. Gen. B-148120, Feb. 27, 1962, it was stated: "In view of the contracting officer's
statement that he feels that he had constructive notice of a mistake in the contractor's bid
prior to award, the contracting officer should have requested [the low bidder] to verify its
bid prior to award."
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